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THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY-HEIRS' RIGHT,
ADVERTISERS' WINDFALL,
OR COURTS' NIGHTMARE?
Richard B. Hoffman *
The use of celebrities' names, pictures, and other identifying character-
istics in connection with the mass merchandising of consumer products and
services has increased greatly in the last decade. Because a celebrity adds
audience appeal to the commercial products that he or she endorses, like
the presence of a much-publicized trademark, the purchasing public's desire
to obtain such products is enhanced. This merchandising phenomenon,
coupled with the media's increased use of the personal attributes' of the
famous in connection with fictionalized movies and novels,2 has escalated
the judicial development of the right of publicity doctrine.
A review of the current cases concerning this right of recent origin3
reveals that celebrities and their heirs are no longer content to permit
unauthorized commercial uses and media portrayals of their publicity rights
to go unchallenged. Merchandisers and media producers, however, are no
longer content with the traditional practice of obtaining consent to use a
celebrity's attributes. Instead, if challenged, they attempt to justify their
unauthorized uses on grounds of fair use,' incidental use,' first amendment
* Partner, McCaleb, Lucas & Brugman, Chicago, Illinois. Admitted to practice before the
United States Patent and Trademark Office; B.S., University of Illinois; J.D., DePaul Univer-
sity; LL.M., John Marshall Law School. The original manuscript of this article was submitted
in partial fulfillment of the author's LL.M. degree requirements.
1. As used herein, the term "attributes" refers to the distinctive, unique features belong-
ing to or associated with a public person. See notes 12-22 and accompanying text infra.
2. For example, the movie and novel entitled Agatha concerned a fictionalized account of
the factual 11 day disappearance of the late mystery novelist, Agatha Christie. Hicks v.
Casablanca Records, 464 F. Supp. 425 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
3. The term "right of publicity" in its currently used context was first judicially recognized
in Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.) (right to grant ex-
clusive privilege of publishing ballplayers' pictures in connection with sale of commercial prod-
uct recognized as "right of publicity" separate and distinct from right of privacy), cert.
denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953). Earlier cases having similar results, but referring only to the right
of privacy, include: Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905)
(publication of plaintiff's likeness in advertisement without his consent held to be libelous inva-
sion of plaintiff's right to privacy); Munden v. Harris, 153 Mo. App. 652, 134 S.W. 1076
(1911) (publication of child's picture, without consent, accompanied by a false statement in
advertisement held libelous as exposing child to ridicule).
4. See note 114 and accompanying text infra.
5. The incidental use doctrine protects against the unauthorized use of a name or likeness
that is not directly or deliberately associated with the promotion of a product or service. See,
e.g., Young v. That Was The Week That Was, 312 F. Supp. 1337, 1342 (N.D. Ohio 1969)
(reference to plaintiff's large family on a satirical television show was not unjust enrichment
because it was not used to promote a product).
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privileges, 6 or as the use of material that is already in the public domain.'
The latter defense is especially common when deceased celebrities are in-
volved.
Although its importance is rapidly increasing, the right of publicity has
not been treated uniformly. For example, it often has been compared to
and confused with the personal right of privacy. It is one thesis of this Arti-
cle, therefore, that for the right of publicity to be protected effectively, it
should not be viewed as a hybrid right. It cannot be a personal right as to
some aspects and a property right as to others. Rather, this right must be
uniformly treated as a property right. This Article also illustrates that the
right of publicity, as a fully alienable property right, is fully descendible, re-
maining subject, however, to the same stringent first amendment strictures
that apply before a celebrity's death.
To place the emerging common law right of publicity into a proper
perspective, this Article defines this tort, traces its historical development
including its ill-conceived connection with the right of privacy, compares
the right with other similar rights, and discusses the important questions of
its conflict with first amendment privileges, its property status, and the ra-
tionales for its descendibility. This Article then examines recent judicial
concerns with the descent of this right and concludes with an expression of
the desired scope and expansion of this right.
It should be noted that this Article does not concern itself with state
privacy statutes, 8 which provide relief from commercial appropriation of
private citizens' personalities. Neither does this Article consider the average
citizen who, through some singular event such as misfortune or disaster, is
thrown into the public gaze, 9 nor with those who become famous through a
6. See notes 128-37 and accompanying text infra.
7. It is argued that when a celebrity has been deceased for a period of such length and the
heirs have waived any rights they may have such that the celebrity is said to be within the
public domain, overriding free speech interests afford third parties a privilege of free exploita-
tion. See, e.g., Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 603 P.2d 425, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323
(1979) (Bird, C.J., dissenting). Fifty years has been suggested as the length of time the person
must be deceased before the rights are said to be in the public domain. Id. at 847, 603 P.2d at
447, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 344.
8. Sections 50 and 51 of the New York Civil Rights Law are representative of a misappro-
priation-type right of privacy that is recognized by state statute. Section 50 provides:
A person, firm, or corporation that uses for advertising purposes, or for the pur-
poses of trade, the name, portrait or picture of any living person without having
first obtained the written consent of such person, or if a minor of his or her parent
or guardian, is guilty of a misdemeanor.
N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 50 (McKinney 1976). Section 51 provides civil relief. Id. § 51. Accord,
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (West Supp. 1981); VA. CODE § 8.01-40 (1977). See also Comment,
Commercial Appropriation of An Individual's Name, Photograph, or Likeness: A New
Remedy for Californians, 3 PAC. L.J. 651 (1972) (discussing the California privacy statute).
9. See, e.g., Leverton v. Curtis Publishing Co., 192 F.2d 974, 976 (3d Cir. 1951) ("[Olne
who is the subject of a striking catastrophe is the object of legitimate public interest."). The
proper course for a private individual who is plucked from an obscure station in life against
his or her will should be a right of privacy action for injury to feelings due to the unauthorized
[Vol. 3 1:1
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life of crime."0 Instead, it concerns the publicity rights of true public per-
sons who seek to prevent third parties from misappropriating their identities
for profit. Those individuals possess publicity values of a size and nature
that require protection from misappropriation.'
THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY: THE RIGHT TO BE
FREE FROM COMMERICIAL EXPLOITATION
A public person has been defined as "a person who, by his accomplish-
ments, fame or mode of living, or by adopting a profession or calling which
gives the public a legitimate interest in his doings, his affairs, and his char-
acter, has become a 'public personage.' He is, in other words, a
celebrity."'" This definition also should include anyone who actively at-
tempts to achieve or maintain celebrity status.' 3 A celebrity's unique "per-
sona" is the combination of all personal attributes. Each of these distinct
aspects is protectible under the right of publicity. Although not a com-
prehensive list,' such aspects include a celebrity's name, nickname, 5 stage
appropriation of name or likeness for commercial purposes. See notes 83-105 and accompany-
ing text infra.
10. See, e.g., Gordon, Right of Property in Name, Likeness, Personality and History, 55
Nw. U.L. REV. 553, 590-93 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Gordon]. It is not socially desirable
that criminals be able to acquire and protect property rights in their personal attributes or in
the aspects of their crimes since their particular creative efforts do not benefit mankind. A
judge-made limitation on the right of publicity to prevent criminals and their heirs from reap-
ing any such ill-gotten gains is being developed. See, e.g., Factors Etc., Inc. v. Creative Card
Co., 444 F. Supp. 279, 285 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) ("Whatever else Al Capone was doing in life, he
was not trying to create an image with widespread commercial appeal.") (citing Maritote v.
Desilu Prods., 345 F.2d 418 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 883 (1965)). See also Leopold v.
Levin, 45 Ill. 2d 434, 259 N.E.2d 250 (1970) (no right of privacy attached to plaintiff's par-
ticipation in a crime that attracted international publicity and was publicized by the plaintiff
himself); In re Berkowitz, 103 Misc. 2d 823, 430 N.Y.S.2d 904 (1979) (crime victims compensa-
tion act providing for royalties from the sale of the literary rights to a convicted criminal's
story be paid to court for distribution to families of victims held constitutional and not
violative of criminal's right of publicity).
11. Cf. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 203, 217 (1954)
(damages celebrity may claim for publicity rights infringement will depend upon degree of
fame attained) [hereinafter cited as Nimmer].
12. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 823 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited
as PROSSER]. Herein, the terms "celebrity," "personality," "public person," "the famous,"
and "persona" will be used interchangeably.
13. The list of who qualifies as a celebrity in a right of publicity context is endless. A suc-
cinct definition by one commentator describes a celebrity as an "actor, author, artist, politi-
cian, model, athlete, musician, industrialist, executive, playboy or any other of a hundred
types who wish to be in the public eye for any of a hundred reasons." Donenfeld, Property or
Others Rights in the Names, Likenesses, or Personalities of Deceased Persons, 16 BULL.
COPYRIGHT SOCY 17, 20 (1968).
14. One commentator has listed broader aspects of one's personality that can be misap-
propriated for purposes of a privacy action. Green, The Right of Privacy, 27 ILL. L. REV. 237,
239 (1932), quoted in Gordon, supra note 10, at 556. Broad personality traits, however, such
as physical integrity, feelings or emotion, and capacity for activity or service are not properly
protectible under the right of publicity.
15. See, e.g., Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 90 Wis. 379, 397, 280 N.W.2d 129, 137
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name," picture," likeness, image, identity, act, 8 traits,1 9 walk, habits,
style, reputation,2" history, statistics, facts concerning professional careers,
signature, 2' and any identifiable personal property, such as a distinctive race
car.
22
The need for publicity right protection arises most commonly when a
commercial advertiser uses a celebrity's name, picture, or likeness to pro-
mote a particular product or service. Such uses of publicity rights are ex-
tremely valuable to celebrities as royalties sometimes exceed $1,000,000.23
Thus, the licensing of one's public persona can become a very significant
source of income to a celebrity and his grantees.2 ' The extreme value placed
on some public images occurs because the image the usual celebrity
(1979) (nickname "Crazylegs" was clearly identified with plaintiff and warranted protection
under the right of publicity).
16. See, e.g., Premier-Pabst Corp. v. Elm City Brewing Co., 9 F. Supp. 754, 761 (D.
Conn. 1935) (when public associated "Old Maestro" with radio broadcaster under contract to
promote plaintiff's product, defendant was precluded from using slight variation of that name
as tradename); Winterland Concessions Co. v. Creative Screen Design, 210 U.S.P.Q. 6 (BNA)
(N.D. 111. 1980) (defendants preliminarily enjoined from selling products bearing the names
and symbols of various rock groups).
17. See, e.g., Brinkley v. Casablancas, 80 A.D.2d 428, 438 N.Y.S.2d 1004 (1981) (defen-
dant's sale of posters portraying plaintiff without plaintiff's written consent subjects defendant
to liability under statutory right of publicity).
18. But see Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 498 F. Supp. 71, 74 (E.D.
Mich. 1980) ("Here's Johnny" is not such a strong and distinctive identification of entertainer
Johnny Carson that its use is foreclosed from the market place).
19. See, e.g., Groucho Marx Prods. v. Playboy Enters., No. 77 Civ. 1782 (S.D.N.Y. Dec.
30, 1977) (persona of Groucho Marx described as his curly hair, moustache, eyebrows, and
ever-present cigar, all unified by his zany expressions), reh'g granted, No. 77 Civ. 1782
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 1979).
20. But see Lombardo v. Doyle, Dane & Bernbach, Inc., 58 A.D.2d 620, 396 N.Y.S.2d 661
(1977) (the word "reputation" is not synonymous with the word "name" as used in a New
York statute prohibiting the use of a living person's name for commercial purposes without
written consent).
21. United States Life Ins. Co. v. Hamilton, 238 S.W.2d 289, 292 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951)
("The use of an individual's signature for business purposes unquestionably constitutes the ex-
ercise of a valuable right of property in the broadest sense of that term.").
22. Motschenbacker v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974) (profes-
sional race car driver whose car was used in a television commercial had cause of action for in-
fringement of publicity rights).
23. See, e.g., Sales v. Christy, 168 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 62, 63 (Patent Off. Trademark Trial
and App. Bd. 1970) ("Soupy Sales" products); Chicago Tribune, Jan. 14, 1981, § 3, at 1, col.
I (John Lennon memorabilia).
24. In this regard, courts have noted that even though some might prefer to avoid such ac-
tivities, a celebrity's endorsement of a commercial product is a common occurrence and does
not indicate either a diminution in professional reputation or a loss of professional talent. See,
e.g., Booth v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 362 F. Supp. 343, 349 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) ("it cannot be
said that performing ...commercials would have a tendency directly to injure plaintiff in her
business, profession, or trade."). But see Lahr v. Adell Chem. Co., 300 F.2d 256, 258 (1st Cir.
1962) (court recognized that certain uses of a celebrity's name may imply that he has "stooped
to perform below his class").
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develops has great audience appeal for commercial uses. The celebrity's at-
tributes function as a trademark. The specific attributes draw the public's
attention to any commercial products with which the celebrity is associated.
Thus, the use of a celebrity's personal features, whether authorized or not,
is intended to and does make a company's product or service more
desirable." Nevertheless, a celebrity's attributes have value as a commercial
endorsement only because of their past public disclosure, publicity, and cir-
culation and because the public attributes goodwill, feats of skill, or ac-
complishments to the personality. 2 6 Moreover, the drawing power present in
a celebrity's publicity rights has been created through his own hard work
and sacrifice and the relinquishment of his own privacy."7 In other words, a
celebrity's unique act, special recognized skill, or particular cultivated look
is solely the product of his or her own labors, talents, energy, time, efforts,
and expense."H
A distinctive aspect of the common law right of publicity, therefore, is
the judicial recognition of the actual or potential commercial value of a
celebrity's personal attributes and the resultant protection of the proprietary
interest in the profitability of a celebrity's public reputation. 2' This right
can be defined as the exclusive right of commercial exploitation of a cele-
brity's property rights in his personal attributes. 3°
It has been recognized that as much of the economic value inherent in a
celebrity's right of publicity lies in the right of exclusive control over the
use of his well known name, act, or skill as it does in the public recognition
25. See, e.g., Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277, 1278 (D. Minn. 1970) ("the use
of the baseball players' names and statistical information is intended to and does make defen-
dant's game more saleable to the public").
26. Id. at 1283.
27. See Treece, Commercial Exploitation of Names, Likenesses, and Personal Histories, 51
TEx. L. REV. 637, 646 (1973).
28. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 575 (1977) (performer of
"human cannonball" act brought a suit against a television station for broadcasting his entire
act).
29. Chaplin v. National Broadcasting Co., 15 F.R.D. 134, 139-40 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) (right of
publicity recognized as economic value associated with a celebrity's name and pictures).
30. The right of publicity has been defined in various ways. One court asserted that "[tihe
so-called right of publicity means in essence that the reaction of the public to name and
likeness, which may be fortuitous or which may be managed or planned, endows the name and
likeness of the person involved with commercially exploitable opportunities." Lugosi v.
Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 824, 603 P.2d 425, 431, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323, 329 (1979).
Another court defined the right of publicity to include "the exclusive interest in the financial
worth of one's personality constitut[ing] a legally protected interest." Spahn v. Julian Messner,
Inc., 43 Misc. 2d 219, 226, 250 N.Y.S.2d 529, 537 (1964), aff'd, 23 A.D.2d 216, 260 N.Y.S.2d
451 (1965), aff'd, 18 N.Y.2d 324, 221 N.E.2d 543, 274 N.Y.S.2d 877 (1966), vacated and
remanded, 387 U.S. 239 (1967) (remanded for further consideration in light of Time, Inc. v.
Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967)). One commentator has broadly defined the right of publicity to ex-
tend to "the right to recover for the misappropriation of plaintiff's interest in personal name
and likeness [and] . . . to other characteristics as well." Comment, Transfer of the Right of
Publicity: Dracula's Progeny and Privacy's Stepchild, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1103, 1105 n.17
(1975) [hereinafter cited as Dracula's Progeny].
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of these personal attributes.3 ' But if the celebrity cannot prevent others
from capitalizing upon his identity, he will be unable to sell licenses or pur-
sue a business utilizing his publicity rights. Any unauthorized use of a per-
former's publicity rights will undoubtedly disrupt his efforts to control his
reputation, and may well alter his public image. In addition, an unauthor-
ized use in one field may preclude his attempts at future authorized promo-
tions in that or other fields.3"
In light of this valuable commercial potential in a celebrity's attributes,
an unjust enrichment theory is used to protect publicity rights. The under-
lying rationale is that a celebrity has the sole right, subject to overriding
first amendment considerations,33 to enjoy the fruits of his own labors free
from unjustified interference. 3" It is unjust to allow an advertiser or mer-
chandiser to benefit from the use of a celebrity's attributes without compen-
sating the source. Also, it is inequitable for the celebrity to be unable to
control any tasteless exposure that might injure his valuable public image."
Thus, because celebrities have such unique, legitimate proprietary interests
in their public personalities that require protection, courts grant them
relief. 6
31. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 575 (1977) (much of the
economic value of plaintiff's human cannonball act lies in his exclusive control over publicity
of the act because if the act can be seen on television the public will be less willing to pay to
see it performed elsewhere).
32. See Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 851-54, 603 P.2d 425, 449-51, 160
Cal. Rptr. 323, 347-49 (1979) (Bird, C.J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority's decision for
reversing the trial court and allowing unlimited use of a celebrity's likeness).
33. See notes 128-37 and accompanying text infra.
34. Palmer v. Schonhorn Enters., Inc., 96 N.J. Super. 72, 79, 232 A.2d 458, 462 (1967)
(court spoke in terms of right of privacy; however, the conduct at issue was the use of data for
commercial profit and thus more appropriately characterized as an infringement of the right of
publicity).
35. See Brenner, What's in a Name and Who Owns It?, BARRISTER, Winter 1979, at 42,
43.
36. See Lombardo v. Doyle, Dane & Bernbach, Inc., 58 A.D.2d 620, 622, 396 N.Y.S.2d
661, 664 (1977) (there is no doubt that celebrities have a legitimate proprietary interest in their
public personalities). Relief has been granted for several forms of unauthorized use of publicity
rights. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977) (broadcasting
company videotaped and displayed performer's entire act on a newscast); Ettore v. Philco
Television Broadcasting Corp., 229 F.2d 481 (3d Cir.) (television station broadcasted prize
fight without one of the fighters' consent), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 926 (1956); Hicks v.
Casablanca Records, 464 F. Supp. 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (famous writer sought to enjoin movie
producers and publishers from distributing a movie and book about her life); Groucho Marx
Prods. v. Playboy Enters., No. 77 Civ. 1782 (S.D.N.Y. Dec., 30, 1977) (magazine used come-
dian's likeness in pictorial satire without his consent), reh 'g granted, No. 77 Civ. 1782
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 1979); Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Urban Sys., 72 Misc. 2d 788, 340
N.Y.S.2d 144 (use of celebrity's name and biographical data in selling educational career
game), aff'd as modified, 42 A.D.2d 544, 345 N.Y.S.2d 17 (1973); Gautier v. Pro-Football,
Inc., 198 Misc. 850, 99 N.Y.S.2d 812 (animal trainer's act televised at halftime of football
game without approval), aff'd, 199 Misc. 598, 106 N.Y.S.2d 667 (1950), rev'd, 278 A.D. 431,
106 N.Y.S.2d 553 (1951), aff'd, 304 N.Y. 354, 107 N.E.2d 485 (1952); Cher v. Forum Int'l, 7
Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2593 (1981) (publication of unauthorized "exclusive interview" viola-
tion of right of publicity).
[Vol. 31:1
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Generally, a right of publicity plaintiff must prove several elements
before the courts will provide this relief. First, he must establish that his
publicity rights are worth protecting. In other words, he must prove he is a
true celebrity and not merely a private citizen who is complaining that his
right to privacy has been invaded. As previously noted, courts have
fashioned various definitions of a true celebrity, but all definitions basically
focus on the protection of a celebrity's combination of unique personal at-
tributes."
Second, the celebrity must prove that the defendant has clearly
represented one of his attributes to the public. An unauthorized use of an
exact likeness is not a prerequisite, but the defendant must at least use a
recognizable version of the celebrity's attributes before liability will attach.3"
Finally, the plaintiff must prove that the unauthorized portrayal is a true
commercial use that resulted in actual damages and is neither a privileged
use under the first amendment39 nor merely an incidental use. For example,
in Booth v. Curtis Publishing Co.,'" the defendant magazine, in order to at-
tract readers in a subscription advertisement, twice used a photograph of a
well known actress who had been the subject of a previous feature story.
The court held that the magazine, as part of the news media, was privileged
under the first amendment to use excerpts from its past editions to illustrate
the quality of the magazine.' Similarly, an unauthorized portrayal may not
be actionable if it is merely incidental and not connected with the promo-
tion of a product or service." 2 This limitation does not, however, preclude
37. See note 30 and accompanying text supra.
38. See Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974)
(advertisement represented race car driver's well known car); Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp.
723 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (unauthorized printing and publication of portrait of celebrity). But see
Booth v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 362 F. Supp. 343, 347 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (mere imitation of
plaintiff's voice does not constitute use of name or likeness).
In construing §§ 50 and 51 of the New York Civil Rights Law, the New York courts have
indicated that whether a public figure is recognized is not dependent on the number of people
who recognize the figure. "[A]ny sufficiently clear representation of a living person is violative
of the statute if it is used for commercial purposes without the subject's consent." Groucho
Marx Prods. v. Playboy Enters., No. 77 Civ. 1782 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 1977) (citing Negri v.
Schering Corp., 333 F. Supp. 101 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) and Young v. Greneker Studios, Inc., 175
Misc. 1027, 26 N.Y.S.2d 357 (1941)), reh'g granted, No. 77 Civ. 1782 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9,
1977).
39. See notes 128-37 and accompanying text infra.
40. 15 A.D.2d 343, 223 N.Y.S.2d 737, aff'd, 11 N.Y.2d 907, 182 N.E.2d 812, 228
N.Y.S.2d 468 (1962).
41. 15 A.D.2d at 349-50, 223 N.Y.S.2d at 743-44. See also Namath v. Sports Illustrated, 48
A.D.2d 487, 371 N.Y.S.2d 10 (1975) (use of athlete's photograph merely incidental to advertis-
ing contents of magazine, especially when no endorsement by athlete indicated), aff'd, 39
N.Y.2d 897, 352 N.E.2d 504, 386 N.Y.S.2d 397 (1976).
42. See Young v. That Was The Week That Was, 312 F. Supp. 1337, 1343 (N.D. Ohio
1969) (recovery allowed only when there is some deliberate association of celebrity's name or
likeness with the advertisement or promotion of a product); Chaplin v. National Broadcasting
Co., 15 F.R.D. 134, 140 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) (the right of publicity is cognizable only when the
unauthorized use of celebrity's name is connected with advertising or sale of a commodity).
19811
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an action for the appropriation of the very activity that makes the celebrity
famous, such as taping an entertainer's entire performance 3 or recording a
live performance for which he or she ordinarily gets paid. Indeed, a
stronger right of publicity case can be made in those instances than for the
unwarranted appropriation of the celebrity's attributes for the endorsement
of a collateral commercial product."'
Assuming the above requirements are met, the protection of the right of
publicity is given a wide scope. For example, if a celebrity at one time
grants permission, whether free or for a fee, for a particular use of his
name or likeness, that permission has limits both in time and scope. It can-
not be converted into an unpermitted use in another area. Nor can prior
permission be relied upon for a use occurring years later. 4
Another example illustrating the liberal protection given publicity rights is
in the area of a celebrity's biographical data. It is well recognized that the
first amendment protects the biographical form of disseminating news or
historical facts." Thus, a celebrity having well publicized exploits and
achievements has no statutory or common law right to his life story; he
cannot control the exclusive commercial exploitation of his personality in
biographical form, whether it is presented in a book, movie, or magazine.47
It is quite a different case, however, when a third party uses a celebrity's
name and biographical data without consent to endorse a commercial prod-
uct or to accompany the article sold. Assuming the product containing the
biographical information is not used to disseminate news or other legitimate
public interest information, but rather is used solely to enhance a product's
marketability, the courts will protect the qelebrity's publicity rights.48 The
usual defense in such cases is that the celebrity's biographical information is
available to the public in record books, magazines, and other periodicals.
Courts are careful to instruct, however, that although such information em-
bodying the celebrity's public personality has been voluntarily disclosed
through the news media, disclosure does not extinguish the celebrity's pro-
43. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
44. See id. at 576.
45. Grant v. Esquire, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 876, 884 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (magazine cannot refer
to a celebrity's original permitted use as a newsworthy event and thereby convert the original
permission into a perpetual license to use the celebrity as an unpaid model).
46. Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 58 Misc. 2d 1, 294 N.Y.S.2d 122
(1968), aff'd mem., 32 A.D.2d 892, 301 N.Y.S.2d 948 (1969). "Just as a public figure's 'right
of privacy' must yield to the public interest so too must the 'right of publicity' bow where [it]
conflicts with the free dissemination of thoughts, ideas, newsworthy events, and matters of
public interest." 58 Misc. 2d at 6, 294 N.Y.S.2d at 129.
47. See, e.g., Frosch v. Grosset & Dunlap, Inc., 75 A.D.2d 768, 427 N.Y.S.2d 828 (1980).
In Frosch, the executor of Marilyn Monroe's estate complained that Norman Mailer's book,
Marilyn, infringed the right of publicity of the estate. The court held that if a book is a
literary work and not merely a disguised advertisement for a good or service, the right of free
expression outweighs any claim of the right of publicity. Id. at 769, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 829.
48. See, e.g., Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Urban Sys., 72 Misc. 2d 788, 790, 340 N.Y.S.2d
144, 146-47, aff'd as modified, 42 A.D.2d 544, 345 N.Y.S.2d 17 (1973).
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prietary interest in his personal statistics, especially when they are used in a
purely commercial context.' 9
Despite the broad scope of the publicity right, the courts have declined to
protect voice imitations. In general terms, this is an indirect form of misap-
propriation5" concerning such things as a performer's timing, inflection,
tone, singing style, and artistic sound. The majority of courts considering
this question have held that, absent an identification of the celebrity by
name or likeness, the imitation of his or her voice per se does not constitute
unfair competition or violate one's publicity rights."
Booth v. Colgate-Palmolive Co. ' is illustrative of this point. This case
involved radio and television commercials with voice-over imitations of the
plaintiff in the role of her television character Hazel. The court held that
there was no violation of the plaintiff's right of publicity as the commer-
cials in question were anonymous and did not use plaintiff's name and
likeness in any way to identify her as a source of the voice of the Hazel
character. In so holding, the Booth court reasoned that several public policy
reasons dictated that voice alone cannot serve as a celebrity's "trademark"
in a right of publicity sense. 3
49. Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277, 1282-83 (D. Minn. 1970). Cf. Palmer v.
Schonhorn Enters., Inc., 96 N.J. Super. 72, 232 A.2d 458 (1967). In Palmer, a group of well
known golfers obtained an injunction against defendant game company's sale of a parlor game
that used the golfers' names and statistics. Although publishing biographical data of a celebrity
is not a per se invasion of privacy, the court held that "the use of that same data for the pur-
pose of capitalizing upon the name by using it in connection with a commercial project other
than the dissemination of news or articles or biographies does [constitute an invasion of
privacy]." Id. at 79, 232 A.2d at 462. See also note 34 supra.
50. In contrast, an unauthorized tape recording of a celebrity's audio performance con-
stitutes a direct form of misappropriation. See Metropolitan Opera Ass'n v. Wagner-Nichols
Recorder Corp., 199 Misc. 786, 101 N.Y.S.2d 483 (1950) (defendant recorded broadcasted per-
formances, then produced and sold phonograph records), aff'd, 279 A.D. 632, 107 N.Y.S.2d
795 (1951).
51. See Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1970) (singer has
no property rights in her particular style of singing and imitation of that style does not give
rise to a cause of action under unfair competition), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 906 (1971); Miller v.
Universal Pictures Co., 11 A.D.2d 47, 201 N.Y.S.2d 632 (1960) (no property rights exist in the
so-called Glenn Miller sound created by an orchestra under his direction), aff'd, 10 N.Y.2d
972, 180 N.E.2d 248, 224 N.Y.S.2d 662 (1961). See also Davis v. Trans World Airlines, 297 F.
Supp. 1145 (D.C. Cal. 1969) (imitation alone does not give rise to cause of action); Supreme
Records, Inc. v. Decca Records, Inc., 90 F. Supp. 904, 908 (S.D. Cal. 1950) (mere arrange-
ment of a musical composition by entertainer who is not the author of the composition is not a
cognizable property right).
52. 362 F. Supp. 343 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
53. Id. at 347. The Booth court recognized that a right of protection against imitators
would present serious supervisory problems because it would be difficult to police performances.
Also, protection against imitators would impose unnecessary retraints on the potential market
of such a copyright because prospective licensees would have to secure permission front various
performers. Further, such a performance right would contravene constitutional policy concern-
ing durational limits for patented and copyrighted works. The court asserted that the granting
of a performance right monopoly preventing others from imitating a performer's "posture,
gestures, voices, sounds, or mannerism may impede, rather than 'promote the Progress of
useful Arts.'" Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8).
However, one court has held that imitation of a celebrity's truly unique voice is protectible
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Thus, it appears that when there is a recognizable imitation of a
celebrity's unique voice, but this imitation is made without any accompany-
ing identification of the celebrity's name or likeness, such as in a radio
commercial, no interference with the celebrity's right of publicity exists.
The holdings in Booth and similar cases, however, fall short of the mark. A
logical distinction can be made between the unauthorized imitation of a
celebrity's unique and recognizable voice used solely for commercial pur-
poses, such as in a television advertisement, and another performer's
creative imitation of that celebrity's voice in their own acts, such as in the
acts of entertainer Rich Little." ' Based on this distinction, the Booth court's
fears would not be pertinent to voice imitations used in purely commercial
settings. For example, a celebrity whose recognizable voice is imitated
without authorization to sell household cleaner over the radio could prevail
in a right of publicity action. Yet other performers' creative imitations of
that celebrity's voice in their own performances, whether authorized or not,
could not be enjoined.
In light of the foregoing, the particular personal attribute involved must
not be too abstract to define or too difficult for the court to police to be
protected under the right of publicity."
Societal Interests Served In Protecting The Right Of Publicity
Recognition and protection of the right of publicity serve several state
and public interests.' The benefit to the public derived through entertain-
ment is probably the most important of the state interests.' 7 An enforceable
right of publicity acts as an economic incentive for a celebrity to make the
immense investments in time, effort, and money that are required to pro-
duce a unique performance of interest to the public." Additionally, the
state seeks to protect the economic value of a performer's persona so that
under unfair competition principles. Lahr v. Adell Chem. Co., 300 F.2d 256 (1st Cir. 1962).
Another case has indicated that re-recording a singer's songs in an intentionally degrading
manner may give rise to a cause of action for violation of the singer's right to publicity. Gee v.
Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 471 F. Supp. 600 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd, 612 F.2d 572 (3d Cir. 1979).
Finally, one court has held that a musical performer, by rendering a song and giving it novel
artistic value, has participated in the creation of a product in which he is entitled to a property
right. Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Station, Inc., 327 Pa. 433, 441, 194 A. 631, 635 (1937).
54. But see Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339 (D.N.J. 1981). In Russen, the
court granted a preliminary injunction that restrained an Elvis Presley impersonator from com-
mitting acts resembling or representing Elvis Presley's appearance in connection with imitations
of Presley's vocal style. Id. at 1382-83. This case no doubt could be argued to apply to celebrity
look-alike situations as well.
55. Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836, 845 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
56. Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 90 Wis. 2d 379, 280 N.W.2d 129 (1979). The right
of publicity is supported by the public policy interests of "controlling the effect on one's
reputation of commercial uses of one's personality and [preventing] unjust enrichment of those
who appropriate the publicity value of another's identity." Id. at 391, 280 N.W.2d at 134.
57. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 573 (1977).
58. Id. at 573, 575.
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he alone can enjoy the fruits of his labors.59 By safeguarding the celebrity's
proprietary interest in his publicity rights, the state helps assure that in-
dividuals will aspire to become, or remain, well known celebrities.
A third public policy consideration underlying protection of the right of
publicity is the prevention of unjust enrichment by those who misap-
propriate the publicity value of a celebrity's identity."0 The misappropriator
should not be permitted to obtain, at no charge, that for which he would
ordinarily have to pay. 6 Furthermore, the state has an interest in protecting
the right of publicity because the commercial use of a celebrity's name or
unique characteristics affects the celebrity's reputation.' 2 This interest is
especially important whether the person has never commercially exploited
his publicity value 3 or has always attempted to cultivate a reputation as an
exemplary individual .
6
A final policy consideration involves the celebrity, his heirs, and his
business associates more personally than the four societal interests outlined
above. Yet, this interest is also ancillary to the state's interests of encourag-
ing the creation of unique personas and preventing unjust enrichment. This
more personal interest is in the establishment of an ongoing, valuable, en-
forceable asset of the celebrity's publicity rights, which is the ultimate
fulfillment of the celebrity's hopes and expectations. Although this interest
may have only secondary importance to celebrities who are beginning their
careers, it is of prime consideration to those who are extremely successful
and older, or who wish to begin actively marketing their publicity rights.
Furthermore, they intend to leave their publicity rights to their heirs or to
the persons with whom they contract. 6' The courts have not yet found a
logical reason to deny state protection of the commercial interests in a
celebrity's publicity rights.
Moreover, state protection of the right of publicity does not conflict with
either the United States Constitution 6 or the federal copyright laws.' 7 For
example, a state based right of publicity, whether protected while the per-
59. The public interest in the right to publicity "is closely analogous to the goals of patent
and copyright law, focusing on the right of the individual to reap the reward of his endeavors
and having little to do with protecting feelings or reputation." Id. at 573.
60. Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 90 Wis. 2d 379, 391, 280 N.W.2d 129, 134 (1979).
61. Kalven, Privacy in Tort Law-Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROBS. 326, 331 (1966) (no social purpose served by allowing defendant to commercially
appropriate plaintiff's likeness for free if defendant would normally have to pay).
62. Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 90 Wis. 2d 379, 391, 280 N.W.2d 129, 134 (1979).
63. See note 24 supra.
64. See O'Brien v. Pabst Sales Co., 124 F.2d 167, 168-69 (5th Cir. 1942) (football player
developed reputation of encouraging young people not to drink alcohol).
65. See note 157 and accompanying text infra.
66. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 577-79 (1977) (Constitu-
tion does not prevent a state from protecting entertainers to encourage the creation and pro-
duction of entertainment).
67. Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836, 846 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (federal
copyright laws do not pre-empt a state based right of publicity because the right of publicity
does not interfere with the federal copyright schemes). See note 177 and accompanying text infra.
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sonality is living or deceased, does not prevent others from benefiting under
the federal patent or copyright laws. 6 Others are still free to stage their
own acts and productions, create their own skills and develop their own
unique personas. Likewise, advertisers and manufacturers are free to make
and sell their own commercial products that are not otherwise copyrighted
or patented. The only prohibition is that in so doing they cannot use a
celebrity's publicity rights without proper authorization. This prohibition,
however, is no greater, nor more burdensome than that placed upon one
seeking to use another's well known trademark. Thus, federal law does not
prevent the state from recognizing and protecting its various societal in-
terests in granting protection to publicity rights.
Types Of Relief For Interference With The Right Of Publicity
If a celebrity's publicity rights have been violated, both injunctive relief
and damages are appropriate remedies. The courts grant injunctive relief to
terminate the unauthorized marketing of a celebrity's unique personal at-
tributes.69 In addition, injunctive relief grants the celebrity the opportunity
to determine whether or how this publicity right will be marketed.7"
A celebrity also is entitled to recover damages for misappropriation of
publicity rights.7 ' In contrast to damages awarded in privacy cases, which
compensate for injury to feelings, damages in publicity cases generally com-
pensate for the value of the appropriated publicity.72 Thus, a celebrity
usually recovers a proportion of the profits the defendant realized. Because
recovery in some instances may be limited to only nominal damages when
based upon a proportion of profits, one court has held that a defendant's
68. Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 849-51, 603 P.2d 425, 448, 160 Cal. Rptr.
323, 346 (1979) (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
69. Injunctive relief is available in right of publicity actions because "[niothing so exclu-
sively belongs to a man or is so personal and valuable to him as his name." Fairfield v.
American Photocopy Equip. Co., 138 Cal. App. 2d 82, 90, 291 P.2d 194, 199 (1955) (quoting
State ex rel. La Follette v. Hinkle, 131 Wash. 86, 93, 229 P. 317, 319 (1924)). See Uhlaender v.
Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277, 1283 (D. Minn. 1970) (celebrity's proprietary interest in his
public personality can be protected through injunctive relief).
70. See Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339 (D.N.J. 1981). In Russen, the court
acknowledged that in unfair competition or trademark infringement cases the public interest
generally favors preliminary injunctive relief. Similarly, in a right of publicity claim, if the
"moving party has demonstrated a likelihood of success [an injunction should be granted]
'because the public . . . is interested in fair competitive practices and clearly opposed to being
deceived in the market place.'" Id. at 1382 (quoting McNeil Labs., Inc. v. American Home
Prods. Corp., 416 F. Supp. 804, 809 (D.N.J. 1976)). See also Joel v. Various John Does, 499
F. Supp. 791 (E.D. Wis. 1980) (in light of damages to rock star and his exclusive licensee,
unauthorized vendors enjoined from selling Billy Joel merchandise at concert halls).
71. See Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (plaintiffs en-
titled to actual damages for appropriation of their property rights); Grant v. Esquire, Inc., 367
F. Supp. 876 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (celebrity should be able to recover the fair market value of the
unauthorized use of his face, name, and likeness).
72. See generally 3 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 14.02 (1981) (computation of
actual damages in copyright infringement cases).
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actual loss or gain on the commercial product in which a celebrity's name
or likeness is improperly used is not pertinent to the issue of damages.' 3
This court explained that the celebrity's actual loss of compensation is what
is at issue rather than the misappropriator's possible unjust enrichment.
Whether the defendant had a gain or loss, the court concluded, may be
relevant only in calculating the amount of damage."'
The extent of interference with a celebrity's right of publicity is not
generally capable of exact measurement." Several relevant factors may,
however, be used to compute a celebrity's damages. First, a court can deter-
mine the fair market value of the celebrity's publicity rights.' 6 The fair
market value may be ascertained by considering the level of fame and
esteem the celebrity has achieved or by reviewing the celebrity's prior earn-
ings and contracts, such as for performances, endorsements, personal ap-
pearances or magazine articles." The fair market value also can be deter-
mined, as done in trademark and patent cases, by using an established
royalty rate from a prior license.'" Second, a court can compare the celeb-
rity in question to another celebrity of equal stature who is in the same
general field of endeavor.' 9 Finally, the court should consider that a per-
sonality had never licensed his publicity rights and, in fact, may have
abhorred the thought of doing so."0 This factor is important because the in-
itial use of a celebrity's likeness or name may be much more valuable than
the fiftieth use.
On the other hand, there are factors that tend to diminish a celebrity's
recovery of damages. A court may consider that the defendant made no
profit from the unauthorized use of the celebrity's name or likeness. Fur-
thermore, if the celebrity's name or picture was only one of many, a court
will consider that the celebrity has not been specifically exploited in deter-'
mining damages for interference with the right of publicity.'
73. Hogan v. A.S. Barnes & Co., 114 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 314, 321 (Pa. Ct. C.P. 1957).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 321-22. See also Grant v. Esquire, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 876, 881 (S.D.N.Y. 1973)
(courts should take judicial notice that there is active market for exploitation of celebrities'
publicity rights and that experts, as in trademark infringement and unfair competition cases,
can be used to value those rights).
76. See Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, 824 n.1l (9th Cir.
1974) ("the greater the fame or notoriety of the identity appropriated, the greater will be the
extent of the economic injury suffered").
77. Hogan v. A.S. Barnes & Co., 114 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 314, 322 (Pa. Ct. C.P. 1957).
78. See Julien v. Gomey & Andre Tractor Repairs, Inc., 512 F. Supp. 955 (D.C. La. 1981)
(ascertaining damages for patent infringement allows patent holder to be compensated for an
amount not less than a reasonable royalty).
79. Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 90 Wis. 2d 379, 386, 280 N.W.2d 129, 132 (1979)
(evidence that the usual minimum compensation for the appropriation of an athlete's name on
an unrelated product was five percent of the gross sales).
80. Grant v. Esquire, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 876, 881 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (one element of
damages is whether plaintiff has sanctioned commercial use of his celebrity status).
81. Hogan v. A.S. Barnes & Co., 114 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 314, 322 (Pa. Ct. C.P. 1957) (in
determining the amount of damages courts must consider whether defendants deal exclusively
with plaintiff).
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Although presumably all individuals possess the right of publicity, a
proper rule of damages would place a logical limitation on this right. Under
this rule, the courts should require a plaintiff to meet a threshold standard
of proof, similar in nature to the trademark law's doctrine of secondary
meaning, in order to establish one's celebrity status and fame. 2 For exam-
ple, the name of an average citizen who is not well known does not require
protection because it has no recognizable publicity value. The proprietary
commercial value necessary for protection under the right of publicity is ab-
sent in such noncelebrity cases. Instead, when the name or likeness of a
private citizen is misappropriated for commercial purposes, it is only that
citizen's feelings that need be protected. Such protection can be adequately
accomplished under a right of privacy action. Nevertheless, as will be
demonstrated, a right of privacy action does not adequately protect a
celebrity's publicity rights.
ANALYSIS OF OTHER COMPARABLE RIGHTS
The Right of Privacy
The right of privacy doctrine was established for the protection against
injuries to one's feelings. 3 This right has been defined as:
the unwarranted appropriation or exploitation of one's personality, the
publicizing of one's private affairs with which the public has no legitimate
concern, or the wrongful intrusion into one's private activities, in such a
manner as to outrage or cause mental suffering, shame, or humiliation to
a person of ordinary sensibility."
Professor William Prosser organized these various privacy rights into four
distinct categories." Prosser's categories involve a specific harm or injury to
feelings from an interference with the right to be let alone. The fourth type,
82. See Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723, 729 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (recognizing that
former heavyweight boxing champion had achieved celebrated status); Premier-Pabst Corp. v.
Elm City Brewing Co., 9 F. Supp. 754, 760 (D. Conn. 1935) (court noted that it is often dif-
ficult to discern whether plaintiff has achieved public identification). See also Pilhel, The Right
of Publicity, 27 BULL. COPYRIGHT SocY 249, 256 (1980). In this article, the author analyzed
the right of publicity's threshold requirement of establishing celebrity status. The article sug-
gested that the court's use of the word "celebrity" in Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579
F.2d 215, 222 n.l (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979), implied that the right of
publicity does not exist from birth.
83. The right of privacy doctrine was first espoused in Warren & Brandeis, The Right to
Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV. 193 (1890). The courts subsequently relied on the reasoning in this
article in recognizing the right. See, e.g., Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190,
50 S.E. 68 (1905) (seminal case recognizing the right of privacy in which the court specifically
relied on the Warren & Brandeis article).
84. Continental Optical Co. v. Reed, 119 Ind. App. 643, 648, 86 N.E.2d 306, 308 (1949)
(quoting Annot., 138 A.L.R. 22 (1942)) (use of plaintiff's photograph for advertising purposes
without consent).
85. PROSSER, supra note 12, at 804. Prosser's four categories are: (1) intrusion upon plain-
tiff's physical solitude or seclusion; (2) public disclosure of private facts about plaintiff; (3)
placement of plaintiff in a false light in the public eye; and (4) misappropriation of plaintiff's
name or likeness for commercial purposes for defendant's benefit. This fourth category is
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in addition to involving personal harm, can involve a pecuniary loss from
an interference with a property right.8 6
Each of Prosser's four privacy rights, therefore, centers on the injured
feelings of the person whose private life has been invaded. Thus, the courts
view any publicity about someone such as an entertainer, whose life is by
plan a public book, as not offensive to one of ordinary sensibilities.8 7 As a
result, the right of privacy is of very limited benefit to a celebrity because
his feelings cannot be injured, or his right to be let alone invaded, if he is
constantly seeking the public limelight. Further, with the right of privacy
the unauthorized dissemination of information is properly restricted when
the information places a person in a false light before the public."8 In con-
trast, the right of publicity doctrine does not prevent the dissemination of
information, but rather concentrates on who has the right to do the dis-
seminating ."
From a first amendment standpoint, the celebrity waives his right to
privacy to the extent that the reports concerning him are legitimate news or
to the extent he made his life public."' With certain exceptions,' his right
somewhat similar to the right of publicity. See, e.g., National Bank of Commerce v. Shaklee
Corp., 207 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1005, 1010 (W.D. Tex. 1980).
86. See, e.g., Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277, 1280 (D. Minn. 1970) (game
company's use of ballplayers' names and personal data held to be misappropriation of property
despite that the data was readily available to the public).
87. The "ordinary sensibilities" test is the one most often used in right of privacy cases.
See PROSSER, supra note 12, at 811.
88. See, e.g., Peay v. Curtis Publishing Co., 78 F. Supp. 305 (D.D.C. 1948) (face of
honest taxi driver used with a story about the dishonest propensities of city taxi drivers); Itz-
kovitch v. Whitaker, 115 La. 479, 39 So. 499 (1905) (improper inclusion of plaintiff's photo in
a display of convicted criminals' photos). See generally Wade, Defamation and the Right of
Privacy, 15 VAND. L. REV. 1093 (1962) (demonstrating the overlap between the right of privacy
and defamation in a false light case and suggesting that the law of privacy may eventually sup-
plant the law of defamation).
89. See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 573 (1977)
(television station did not have the right to broadcast a performer's entire circus act because
dissemination of the performance affected its economic value to the performer).
90. See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967) (in a privacy action against a news
magazine, first amendment dictates that newsworthy plaintiff must prove reckless disregard of
facts); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (in libel action brought by public
official against a newspaper, plaintiff must prove defendant's knowledge that statement was
false, or that it was made with reckless disregard of truth or falsity). For an interesting discus-
sion of contemporary libel law and an alternative defense to defamation of public figures, see
Carman, Hutchinson v. Proxmire and the Neglected Fair Comment Defense: An Alternative to
"Actual Malice, " 30 DEPAUL L. REV. 1 (1980).
91. Several aspects of a celebrity's life remain personal even though that person makes his
life public and continually seeks publicity. These areas include a celebrity's deeply personal
relationship with family members and his introspective thoughts and feelings. It is beyond the
scope of this Article, however, to discuss the right of privacy aspects that a celebrity retains
upon entering the public limelight. Neither does this Article attempt to discuss the possibility
of a celebrity's use of both the right of privacy and right of publicity in pursuing unauthorized
portrayals. For a detailed analysis of this possibility, see Comment, Community Property In-
terests in the Right of Publicity: Fame and/or Fortune, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1095 (1978).
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of privacy is substantially subordinated to the first amendment freedoms of
press and speech. 2
This doctrine of limited waiver, however, is not applicable to a celebrity's
publicity rights. When a celebrity's personality has commercial value, courts
will give him protection against unpermitted commercial uses of his per-
sonal attributes, 3 even though he cannot restrict the dissemination of truly
newsworthy information. For commercial purposes, the waiver and dedica-
tion of an entertainer's personality to the public domain is limited to the
specific consent given." The limited waiver defense, therefore, has no ap-
plication to the quite different and independent right to have one's per-
sonality, even if it be that of a celebrity and thus newsworthy, free from
others' commercial exploitation."
As other commentators have explained in greater detail, 6 a confusion of
remedy arose in early cases between the two doctrines of right of privacy
and right of publicity. Litigants filed suits for invasion of privacy rather
than for misappropriation of personality in cases when injury to feelings
had only secondary importance to the more drastic commercial appropria-
tions of name and likeness that were present. This confusion resulted in a
serious conflict in the language and results of the early opinions." Primarily
because of the limited waiver defense in privacy law, the effect of such
mislabeled right of publicity cases was that commercial advertisers were free
to seize upon a celebrity's popularity without compensation.
Other limitations on the right of privacy doctrine also exist that make this
doctrine's use in commercial misappropriation cases undesirable. For exam-
ple, the right of privacy is a personal right that can only be asserted by the
party whose privacy has been invaded. 8 Accordingly, assignment of privacy
rights is prohibited, including those rights falling under the misappropria-
tion category." Any grantee of publicity rights for use on collateral prod-
92. See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 387-88 (1967).
93. See, e.g., Booth v. Curtis Publishing Co., 15 A.D.2d 343, 352, 223 N.Y.S.2d 737, 745
("[tlhat [a celebrity] may have voluntarily on occasion surrendered [her] privacy, for a price or
gratuitously, does not forever forfeit for anyone's commercial profit so much of [her] privacy
as [she] has not relinquished."), aff'd, 11 N.Y.2d 907, 182 N.E.2d 812, 228 N.Y.S.2d 468
(1962).
94. Douglas v. Walt Disney Prods., No. 664-346, (Los Angeles Super. Ct. November 26,
1956).
95. See Booth v. Curtis Publishing Co., 15 A.D.2d 343, 223 N.Y.S.2d 737, aff'd, 11
N.Y.2d 907, 182 N.E.2d 812, 228 N.Y.S.2d 468 (1962).
96. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 10, at 554.
97. See, e.g., O'Brien v. Pabst Sales Co., 124 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1942). See also Green,
The Right of Privacy, 27 ILL. L. REV. 237, 246 (1932) (discussion of the early cases which im-
properly confused the right of privacy with what is now known as the right of publicity).
98. PROSSER, supra note 12, at 814. See, e.g., Kelly v. Johnson Publishing Co., 160 Cal.
App. 2d 718, 325 P.2d 659 (1958) (plaintiffs' privacy action denied because it was not of a per-
sonal nature, but rather a claim that their brother was put in a false light by a magazine arti-
cle).
99. PROSSER, supra note 12, at 815. See, e.g., Hanna Mfg. Co. v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co.,
78 F.2d 763 (5th Cir. 1935) (in privacy action, only baseball players themselves could object to
a manufacturer's use of their names and likenesses). It should be noted that the right of publi-
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ucts'0" is thus precluded from asserting such rights under a privacy theory.
Likewise, since the right of privacy does not generally survive a person's
death, the heirs or grantees of publicity rights are without recourse to en-
force such rights under a privacy theory. Finally, a person need not show
economic harm to state a right of privacy claim. 10' Since prevention of
pecuniary loss is the heart of a right of publicity action, however, proof of
economic loss is usually required when suing to protect publicity rights.' 2
In summary, the right of privacy concerns an individual's mental suffer-
ing and seclusion, while the right of publicity concerns unauthorized com-
mercial uses of a celebrity's attributes. A celebrity does not complain that
he has become a matter of public comment or that he has been placed in a
false light when there has been an unauthorized commercial use of his name
and picture. Rather, he complains that others have exploited the commer-
cial drawing power attached to his name and likeness without compensating
him.' 3 Thus, the critical difference between the right of privacy and the
right of publicity is the nature of the interest protected and the type of in-
jury suffered.' °  In fact, the right of publicity has been called the "very an-
tithesis of the right of privacy. ' ' '°
Although the right to privacy doctrine is an inadequate protection of
publicity rights, two other analogous legal doctrines provide limited protec-
tion. Copyright and trademark laws and unfair competition laws have been
used by celebrities to protect their publicity rights. with varying results.
city-type protection under § 51 of the New York Civil Rights Law is akin to Prosser's fourth
right of privacy category. It is based upon the classic theoretical basis for the right of privacy
of preventing injury to feelings. Thus, the New York statutory right of publicity is not assign-
able during one's lifetime and terminates at death. However, in Lombardo v. Doyle, Dane &
Bernbach, Inc., 58 A.D.2d 620, 396 N.Y.S.2d 661 (1977), the court stated in dicta that New
York's common law right of publicity is under no such inhibition.
100. As used herein, the term "collateral product" is defined as a commercial consumer
item, such as a poster, gameboard, automobile, or article of clothing that is advertised and
sold separately from the activity, such as acting, race car driving, or playing football, by which
the celebrity makes a living and gained the reputation in the first place.
101. PROSSER, supra note 12, at 815. See, e.g., Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122
Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905) (plaintiff need not prove special damages for libelous invasion of
his right to privacy).
102. See notes 37-39 and accompanying text supra.
103. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 573 (1977); Hogan v.
A.S. Barnes & Co., 114 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 314, 316 (Pa. Ct. C.P. 1957).
104. See Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 90 Wis. 2d 379, 280 N.W.2d 129 (1979). As
stated by that court:
[T]hat the right of a person to be compensated for the use of his name for adver-
tising purposes or purposes of trade is distinct from other privacy torts which pro-
tect primarily the mental interest in being let alone. The appropriation tort is dif-
ferent because it protects primarily the property interest in the publicity value of
one's name.
Id. at 387, 280 N.W.2d at 132.
105. Hogan v. A.S. Barnes & Co., 114 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 314, 316 (Pa. Ct. C.P. 1957). See
also Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836, 843 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) ("The protec-
tion from intrusion upon an individual's privacy, on the one hand, and protection from ap-
propriation of some element of an individual's personality for commercial exploitation, on the
other hand, are different in theory and in scope.").
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Copyright and Trademark Rights
A copyright grants a monopoly of limited duration ' to the claimant to
control the reproduction of an original expression or writing that has been
fixed in a tangible form.107 The creative expression forming the subject mat-
ter of a federal copyright must be an original, conscious undertaking. 08
Thus, copyright laws serve to obtain the efforts of authors for the public
and to furnish an incentive to those who strive to create new expressions,
artistic or otherwise." 9 It is deemed socially beneficial that the "[s]acrificial
days devoted to such creative activities deserve rewards commensurate with
the services rendered."''0
In comparison to copyright, a celebrity's right of publicity, although
sometimes the result of fortuitous circumstances, is more often the result of
conscious hard work and planning amounting to purposeful creativity.
Also, the interests to be served by protecting a right of publicity and assign-
ing it a durational limit, if one is ever assigned, are similar to those of
copyright."' In contrast to the copyright author, however, a celebrity does
not create a tangible writing or thing. Rather, the "things" created are the
intangible attributes'2 which the celebrity either has or develops and by
which he or she is known. Finally, the incidental use of a celebrity's publici-
ty rights" 3 or their use in a first amendment setting can be analyzed in light
of the copyright fair use principles.'' For example, a single use of a cele-
106. Currently, a copyright claimant is allowed to control the copying of a particular expres-
sion for the stated term of the life of the author plus 50 years. 17 U.S.C. §§ 302-305 (Supp. Ill
1979). This durational limit is the result of Congress' balancing of two important interests.
First, there is the societal interest of promoting creative efforts by awarding limited exclusive
monopolies on original expressions as mandated by the constitutional copyright clause. See
note 109 infra. Second, there are the countervailing societal interests of free speech and press
guaranteed under the first amendment. See I M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.10
(1981). The free speech interest in copyright law is provided in part by the copyright fair use
doctrine, see note 114 and accompanying text infra, but, ultimately the limited duration of the
copyright protects that interest.
107. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-106 (Supp. 111 1979). For creative expressions created after
January 1, 1978, only federal copyrights are available because common law copyrights are no
longer recognized. Id. § 301.
108. A patent grant, on the other hand, can be for an invention resulting from a fortuitous
event. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1976).
109. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8 provides, in pertinent part: "The Congress shall have Power ...
To promote the Progress of Science .. .by securing for limited Times . . .the exclusive Right
to .. .Writings and Discoveries." The term "writings" has been held to include "any physical
rendering of the fruits of creative intellectual or aesthetic labor." Goldstein v. California, 412
U.S. 546, 561 (1973).
110. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
111. See notes 219 & 220 and accompanying text infra.
112. See notes 14-22 and accompanying text supra.
113. See note 42 and accompanying text supra.
114. The fair use doctrine, which developed originally as a judge-made rule of reason, is
now embodied in 17 U.S.C. § 107 (Supp. I1 1979). "[T]he fair use of copyrighted work ...
for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies
for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright." Id.
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brity's attributes in an original statue or painting conceivably could be
justified as comment under the copyright fair use doctrine. Because of these
similarities, litigants have attempted to base the right of publicity upon
statutory copyright. In at least one.case, ' " however, this attempt failed.
Although not specifically used as a basis for decision by any court, an
alternative for protecting the right of publicity is the law of trademarks. In
essence, the effect of a state's protection against misappropriation of a
celebrity's name and picture is to recognize the celebrity's name as a species
of trade name, and his likeness as a kind of trademark."16 Further, the right
of publicity is akin to a commercial establishment's exclusive right to the
benefits of goodwill and secondary meaning that it has managed to build up
in its business.'' 7 Both a celebrity's publicity rights and a business'
trademark or trade name reflect the public's recognition and awareness that
result from substantial publicity. Finally, another similarity of trademarks
and publicity rights is that rights in each are created at essentially the same
time-upon use with a trademark and upon development and use before the
public with the right of publicity.
Unfair Competition
As yet a further analogy, the right of publicity has been viewed as simply
the application of the doctrine of unfair competition to a particular type of
property right, namely, one's publicity rights." 8 The courts have long ex-
tended the doctrine of unfair competition beyond the concept of fraud on
the public to include the misappropriation of another's benefit or property
right for commercial advantage." 9 However, an element of property must
be found to exist before relief will be granted in a typical unfair competi-
tion case.' 20 This property element requirement limits the use of an unfair
competition theory because some courts refuse to recognize any property
right in a celebrity's publicity rights. Further, many jurisdictions previously
held that the absence of competition between the plaintiff and defendant
presented an effective defense to an unfair competition action.' 2' For exam-
115. See Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836, 842, 846 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)
(defendant failed in an attempt to claim commercial rights to the Laurel and Hardy name
simply because he owned the copyright to several of their motion pictures).
116. See PROSSER, supra note 12, at 807.
117. Grant v. Esquire, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 876, 879 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), quoted in Price v. Hal
Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836, 843 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
118. See, e.g., Hogan v. A.S. Barnes & Co., 114 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 314, 320 (Pa. Ct. C.P.
1957) ("the right of publicity ... is but another way of applying the doctrine of unfair com-
petition").
119. See, e.g., Ettore v. Philco Television Broadcasting Corp., 229 F.2d 481, 490 (3d Cir.)
(broadcasting company's unauthorized use of boxing footage held to be unfair competition),
cert. denied, 351 U.S. 926 (1956).
120. See, e.g., Hogan v. A.S. Barnes & Co., 114 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 314, 320 (Pa. Ct. C.P.
1957) (element of property found in the misappropriation of a famous golfer's picture).
121. For a discussion of the problems that historically plagued a right of publicity action
based upon unfair competition principles, especially the competition requirement, see Nimmer,
supra note 11, at 210.
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pie, a company selling posters could not be considered in competition with
the subject of its posters, such as a famous singer, baseball player, or race
car driver. Also, the passing off requirement'22 for unfair competition ac-
tions made it a difficult theory to utilize when attempting to protect publi-
city rights. For example, a defendant's use of a celebrity's name or likeness
does not always infer the celebrity's endorsement, sponsorship, or approval
of the defendant's products. Thus, in many states, an unfair competition
action failed for lack of proof on this issue. '
A few recent right of publicity decisions, however, have implied that re-
lief is available under unfair competition principles."2 In fact, one publicity
rights case noted that the historically restrictive requirements of passing off
and direct competition "are no longer considered to be essential elements of
a cause of action for unfair competition.""'2 In any event, a celebrity
should be considered entitled to allege an unfair competition cause of action
when the defendant's unauthorized, albeit indirect, use of his publicity
rights presents a likelihood of confusion as to, or a false designation of,
source, approval, sponsorship, or endorsement of the goods or services in
question.' 6 It must be noted, however, that such an unfair competition
theory would require proof of likelihood of confusion, whereas a pure right
of publicity action has no such requirement.
Thus, several rights or theories exist which are somewhat comparable to
122. The "passing off" doctrine requires "misrepresenting one's goods or services as those
of another." Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 90 Wis. 2d 379, 399, 280 N.W.2d 129, 138
(1979). See I R. CALLMANN, LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES
§ 2.02 (L. Altman 4th rev. ed 1981).
123. See, e.g., Bechik Prods. v. Federal Silk Mills, 135 F. Supp. 570 (D. Md. 1955) (confu-
sion with product not sufficient enough to meet the "passing off" requirement).
124. See, e.g., Joel v. Various John Does, 499 F. Supp. 791 (E.D. Wis. 1980) (despite the
absence of competition between plaintiff and defendant, court held the unauthorized sale of
Billy Joel T-shirts to be a violation of state and federal unfair competition statutes); Memphis
Dev. Found. v. Factors, Etc., Inc., 441 F. Supp. 1323, 1330 (W.D. Tenn. 1977) ("Tennessee
courts would protect and safeguard ...the right of publicity, whether or not it would be so
designated, as in the case of unfair competiton ...."), aff'd mer., 578 F.2d 1381 (6th Cir.
1978), rev'd, 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980); Hirsch v. S.C.
Johnson & Son, Inc., 90 Wis. 2d 379, 400, 280 N.W.2d 129, 138 (1979) (modern approach to
the law of unfair competition is to protect "[piroperty rights of commercial value ...from
any form of unfair invasion").
125. Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 90 Wis. 2d 379, 399, 280 N.W.2d 129, 138 (1979).
See also 1 R. CALLMANN, LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES § 2.10,
at 47 (L. Altman 4th rev. ed. 1981) (trade name supported by strong secondary meaning pro-
tected from infringement even when goods involved are noncompetitive).
126. The federal statutory basis for certain types of unfair competition is 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)
(1976). Examples of right of publicity cases relying in part on this statute are Estate of Presley
v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339 (D.N.J. 1981) (court enjoined the performance of an Elvis
Presley imitator on the basis of both the right of publicity and unfair competition under § 1125(a))
and Winterland Concessions Co. v. Creative Screen Design, Ltd., 210 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 6 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (court enjoined the unauthorized sale of products bearing the names
and symbols of various rock groups on the basis of right of publicity and unfair competition
under § 1125(a)).
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the right of publicity.' 27 However, none are truly equivalent and most have
limited application in a publicity rights setting.
FIRST AMENDMENT LIMITATIONS ON THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
The first amendment freedoms of speech and press ordinarily override
publicity rights.'28 In considering the application and scope of the first
amendment privileges, the otherwise different rights of publicity and pri-
vacy actually undergo the same scrutiny and are subject to the same policy
considerations.' 29 When balancing the rights of privacy and publicity
against the defendant's first amendment arguments, courts follow the con-
cept that the best social policy is that which results in the greatest good to
the greatest number.' 30 Thus, over the years, the courts have developed an
extremely liberal interpretation of the scope of the public's legitimate in-
terest in the dissemination of information about celebrities and other public
figures.
For example, unauthorized but newsworthy disseminations about a celeb-
127. Other theories that can be compared to or pleaded in the alternative with the right of
publicity are state deceptive trade act violations, Winterland Concessions Co. v. Creative
Design, Ltd., 210 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 6 (N.D. IlI. 1980) (violation of Illinois Uniform Deceptive
Trade Practices Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, §§ 311-317 (1979), alleged in action to en-
join unauthorized sale of concert T-shirts); trademark dilution; common law misappropriation,
National Bank of Commerce v. Shaklee Corp., 207 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1005 (W.D. Tex. 1980)
(republication of plaintiff's book with inclusion of advertisements that created impression of
an endorsement held to be misappropriation of name and likeness); defamation; trade
disparagement; and interference with contract.
128. In protecting first amendment privileges, courts tend to be quite liberal in determining
whether unauthorized expressions about a celebrity constitute news or are used solely in a com-
mercial context. An expression is considered newsworthy if it disseminates information of
public interest, makes for informed decision making by the public, or is fair comment on the
events of the day. See, e.g., Paulsen v. Personality Posters, Inc., 59 Misc. 2d 444, 448-49, 299
N.Y.S.2d 501, 506-07 (1968) (breadth of privileges under first amendment not limited to news
about current events but extends to activities regarding education, history, entertainment and
amusement).
129. The first amendment limitations that ,have been read into the New York statutory right
of publicity, note 8 supra, provide a useful analogy. See Grant v. Esquire, Inc., 367 F. Supp.
876, 881 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (statutory right of publicity must yield to first amendment privileges
to avoid less than full exploitation of those privileges due to threat of lawsuit); Chaplin v. Na-
tional Broadcasting Co., 15 F.R.D. 134, 138 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) (dissemination of news or report-
ing of matters of public interest not violative of statutory right of publicity); Paulsen v. Per-
sonality Posters, Inc., 59 Misc. 2d 444, 447, 299 N.Y.S.2d 501, 505 (1968) (first amendment
limitations on statutory right of publicity necessary to avoid conflict with dissemination of
newsworthy events). See also Gautier v. Pro-Football, Inc., 304 N.Y. 354, 359, 107 N.E.2d
485, 488 (1952) (the "privilege to use a person's name or photograph in portrayals of current
news or past events of legitimate public or general interest does not, under the [New York]
privacy statute, extend to commercializations of . . . personality through a form of treatment
distinct from the dissemination of news or information").
130. See, e.g., Donahue v. Warner Bros. Pictures Distrib., 2 Utah 2d 256, 264, 272 P.2d
177, 183 (1954) (social policy of greatest good for the greatest number must be considered
when right to privacy conflicts with freedom of expression).
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rity can occur, among other places, in newspapers, magazines, newsreels,
novels, plays, movies, television shows, handbills, and posters. Although
newspapers, magazines, and television usually operate to earn a profit, their
profit motivation does not diminish their primary function of disseminating
newsworthy information.' Similarly, the fact movies and novels are more
commonly considered vehicles of amusement does not detract from their
newsworthy status.' 32 Thus, the medium used for an unauthorized portrayal
of a celebrity's publicity rights is not a factor in determining whether the
portrayal is privileged.
As another example, a problem area encountered in the past by the media
with unauthorized portrayals about a celebrity concerned the question of
fictionalization. A fictionalized portrayal is one having manufactured dia-
logue, imaginary incidents, manipulated chronology, nonfactual noveli-
zation, embellished facts, and distortions. In balancing the right of publicity
against the first amendment in this context, the issue is whether a portrayal
is factually accurate and done primarily in a newsworthy setting or is a fic-
tionalized and sensationalized expression in which the public interest is only
of secondary importance. In early decisions, courts held that the public's
right to know did not extend to dramatized or fictionalized versions of the
event reported. Thus, recovery for an unauthorized, substantially false, or
fictionalized portrayal of a celebrity was originally allowed if the plaintiff
could prove that it was substantially false and was presented with
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard for the truth.' 33 Pure-
ly factual treatments, however, even if subject to inadvertent or superficial
inaccuracies, were privileged and did not lead to liability. The reasoning for
this early rule concerning fictionalization was that news was not
disseminated when a work was substantially false and the author knew of
this falsity. In a right of publicity context, this meant that even though a
celebrity was a public figure with little or no privacy, his personality could
131. See Leverton v. Curtis Publishing Co., 192 F.2d 974, 977 (3d Cir. 1951) (even though
newspaper operates for profit, its use of newsworthy material is not for commercial purposes);
Gordon, supra note 10, at 571-82.
It should be noted, however, that not all media use of one's publicity is privileged. See, e.g.,
Grant v. Esquire, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 876, 878-79 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (under New York law, plain-
tiff should be allowed to prove that a magazine had some covert agreement with an advertiser
for using plaintiff's picture in an article).
132. Donahue v. Warner Bros. Pictures Distrib., 2 Utah 2d 256, 264, 272 P.2d 177, 183
(1954) (movies are an effective medium for serving the important public interest in free
dissemination of public information).
133. See, e.g., Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 21 N.Y.2d 124, 127, 233 N.E.2d 840, 842, 286
N.Y.S.2d 832, 834 (1967), appeal dismissed, 393 U.S. 1046 (1969). The New York Court of
Appeals commented that to allow the use of such fictionalized elements in a novel "would
amount to granting a literary license which is not only unnecessary to the protection of free
speech but destructive of an individual's right-albeit a limited one in the case of a public
figure--to be free of the commercial exploitation of his name and personality." 21 N.Y.2d at
129, 233 N.E.2d at 843, 286 N.Y.S.2d at 836.
[Vol. 31:1
THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
not be fictionalized and exploited for another's benefit without his
consent. 11
The more recent right of publicity cases, however, have viewed fic-
tionalized movies and books-as opposed to products such as bubble gum
cards and posters-as vehicles for disseminating ideas and opinions.'
Despite that the fictionalized portrayal was not biographical, fair comment,
newsworthy, or historical, courts have considered that there are no counter-
vailing policies to prevent protection of important free speech and press in-
terests inherent in fictionalized movies and books, and that the right of
publicity should not be used to chill or control public expression. Although
the author has actually created a totally commercial product about the
celebrity by developing a fictionalized portrayal, the courts have determined
that a first amendment privilege still resides in that new media creation.
Thus, the thrust of recent cases is that the right of publicity does not prevail
in situations where the fictionalized account of a celebrity's life is depicted
in such a way that it is evident to the public that the events depicted are fic-
titious or where there is no deliberate falsification.
On the other hand, first amendment rights do not outweigh publicity
rights in purely commercial situations. Where there are no newsworthy
elements present in an unauthorized use of a celebrity's publicity rights, or
where the portrayal appears in a medium wholly unrelated to the dissemina-
tion of news, there is no chilling restriction placed upon free speech in-
terests as no such interests are present. 3 6 In fact, the United States Supreme
Court has recently implied that the states' recognition and protection of the
right of publicity in purely commercial settings does not operate to infringe
upon first amendment interests in promoting a free press.'
PROPERTY STATUS OF PUBLICITY RIGHTS
In addition to federal law and constitutional considerations, another im-
portant issue bearing on the right of publicity concerns its status. The on-
134. Groucho Marx Prods. v. Playboy Enters., No. 77 Civ. 1782 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 1977),
reh'g granted, No. 77 Civ. 1782 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 1979).
135. Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F. Supp. 426, 430 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (books and
movies are vehicles through which ideas and opinions are disseminated). See also Guglielmi v.
Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 25 Cal. 3d 860, 866-68, 603 P.2d 454, 458-59, 160 Cal. Rptr. 352,
356-57 (1979) (per curiam) (Bird, C.J., concurring) (fictional movie version of actor's life en-
titled to first amendment freedom of expression protection). Cf. Ann-Margret v. High Society
Magazine, Inc., 498 F. Supp. 401, 406 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (reproduction of nude photograph of
plaintiff in magazine sold for profit did not constitute use for advertising purposes and could
not provide basis for right of publicity action); Frosch v. Grosset & Dunlap, Inc., 75 A.D.2d
828, 829 (1980) (right of publicity could not give rise to cause of action against publication of
book about deceased celebrity whether book was biography or fictionalized biography).
136. See, e.g., Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 219, 50 S.E. 68, 80
(1905) (constitutional guarantees of freedom of expression do not extend to the use of one's
picture purely for advertising purposes).
137. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 575-79 (1977).
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going confusion with the right of privacy has created uncertainty as to
whether publicity rights are personal or property in nature or a combination
of both. As discussed later, subsidiary questions such as alienation and des-
cent of publicity rights are more easily resolved once this basic issue is
settled.
Because publicity rights flow from the development and recognition of a
celebrity's personal attributes, it has been argued that the right of publicity
should be treated as a truly personal right. 3 ' As such, the right could not
be transferred or licensed during life nor could it devolve upon death.'
The property aspect of the right of publicity, however, has long been
judicially recognized." 0 For example, in an early unfair competition case
concerning the misappropriation of the name of a popular radio announcer
for advertising purposes, the court held that the celebrity's name had ac-
quired substantial commercial value and, therefore, was considered to be
property protectible by law."'
Indeed, early cases distinguished the right of publicity from the right of
privacy because the former was deemed to be in the nature of property." 2
The courts realized that the misappropriation of the right of publicity was a
distinctly independent tort from invasion of the right of privacy. These
courts reasoned that while Prosser's first three right of privacy categories
involved a specific injury to feelings, the fourth category involved a
pecuniary loss or interference with one's property. '
138. See Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 820-24, 603 P.2d 425, 429-31, 160
Cal. Rptr. 323, 480-83 (1979).
In other cases, however, similar arguments by defendants have fallen on deaf ears. See, e.g.,
Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir.) (legal interest of
a person in the publication of his photograph is not, as defendant asserted, limited to the per-
sonal and non-assignable right to privacy), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953); Hirsch v. S.C.
Johnson & Son, Inc., 90 Wis. 2d 379, 383, 280 N.W.2d 129, 130 (1979) (rejecting defendant's
contention that the right to publicity is part and parcel of the personal right to privacy).
139. See, e.g., Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953) (the defendant asserted that the plaintiff, as a licensee
of the personal right to publicity, had only received a convenant not to be sued, rather than a
legal transfer of a property right). See also PROSSER, supra note 12, at 814-15.
140. See, e.g., Munden v. Harris, 153 Mo. App. 652, 134 S.W. 1076 (1911) (person owns an
exclusive property right in his picture, exploitable for material profit); Edison v. Edison
Polyform Mfg. Co., 73 N.J. Eq. 136, 67 A. 392 (1911) (person's picture, as much as his name,
is his own property).
141. Uproar Co. v. National Broadcasting Co., 8 F. Supp. 358, 361 (D. Mass. 1934), aff'd
as modified, 81 F.2d 373 (1st Cir. 1936).
142. E.g., Ettore v. Philco Television Broadcasting Corp., 229 F.2d 481, 486-87 (3d Cir.)
(right of privacy concerns the personal right to be let alone, while the right of a professional
performer to the commercial exploitation of his services is one of property), cert. denied, 351
U.S. 926 (1956). See also O'Brien v. Pabst Sales Co., 124 F.2d 167, 170 (5th Cir. 1941)
(Holmes, J., dissenting) (right to privacy is distinct from right to use one's name or likeness
for commercial purposes because the latter is a property right), cert. denied, 315 U.S. 823
(1942).
143. E.g., Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277, 1279-82 (D. Minn. 1970).
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As further support for granting property status to publicity rights, one
need only recall the rights and interests concomitant with property. These
include the rights of acquisition, dominion, possession, use, enjoyment, ex-
clusion, and disposition."' A property designation also gives the owner the
right to contest invasions of his property. The value of property is intrin-
sically dependent upon the ability to control its use. Thus, the designation
as property aggregates rights and interests that are capable of being in-
definitely owned, of having value, and of being protected by law.
These property interests, or their equivalents, are, readily identifiable in
publicity rights. First, publicity rights are acquired after years of hard
work, expense, and planning by the celebrity.'"" Second, from the moment
of creation, publicity rights can be possessed by the celebrity. Third,
publicity rights have a recognized commercial value for which others will
pay."' Fourth, the individual attributes embodied in publicity rights, such
as picture, signature, or name, can be readily separated from a celebrity for
commercial purposes. Consequently, the celebrity's exclusive right to use
such personal attributes can be readily transferred to third parties totally
separate from the celebrity or from the activity or endeavor that created the
celebrity's status."' Moreover, because publicity rights can be separated and
transferred, these rights presumably can last indefinitely. Finally, as with
most property rights, a celebrity can suffer pecuniary damage when his
publicity rights are used without authorization." 8
Accordingly, a majority of courts recognize that the right of publicity
constitutes property and is proprietary in nature." 9 In some instances,
144. See R. BROWN, THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY 6 (3d ed. 1975).
145. See, e.g., Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277, 1282 (D. Minn. 1970) (celebrity
has a legitimate proprietary interest in his public personality because of the years of practice
and competition resulting in that marketable identity); Hogan v. A.S. Barnes & Co., 114
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 314, 319 (Pa. Ct. C.P. 1957) (famous golfer's reputation was acquired
through a tremendous amount of work, ability, and perseverance); Madison Square Garden
Corp. v. Universal Pictures Co., 255 A.D. 459, 464, 7 N.Y.S.2d 845, 850 (1938) (goodwill and
advertising value of plaintiff's name and entertainment structure is a property right created
through expenditures of huge amounts of money, effort, and skill).
146. See, e.g., Cepeda v. Swift & Co., 415 F.2d 1205, 1206 (8th Cir. 1969) (sports figure has
valuable property right in his name and likeness which he may sell for profit); Haelan Labs.,
Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir.) ("property" label symbolizes
that courts will enforce a claim having pecuniary worth), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953);
Sharman v. C. Schmidt & Sons, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 401, 407 (E.D. Pa. 1963).(sports figure has
a valuable property right in his name and likeness and a valid claim for damages when it is
misappropriated). See also Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836, 844 (S.D.N.Y.
1975) (right of publicity is purely commercial in nature).
147. See note 161 infra.
148. See notes 71-81 and accompanying text supra.
149. E.g., Factors Etc., Inc. v. Creative Card Co., 444 F. Supp. 279, 282-84 (S.D.N.Y.
1977); Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836, 843 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). But cf. Miller
v. Commissioner, 299 F.2d 706, 708-10 (2d Cir.) (right to publicity is not a descendible proper-
ty interest within the meaning of Internal Revenue Code), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 923 (1962).
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however, a celebrity's attributes are not granted property status. For exam-
ple, neither a famous bandleader's particular sound' 0 nor a celebrity's
voice ' have been uniformly found to constitute property. In addition, a
question has arisen as to whether the publicity rights of owners of famous
objects, such as buildings or animals, or a well known character developed
by and associated with a celebrity, constitute property. The courts and com-
mentators tend to think they do."'
It is urged, however, that the right of publicity uniformly be granted
property status. Designating publicity rights as property allows celebrities to
protect these rights by recovering damages and obtaining injunctions for in-
vasion of their publicity rights.' 53 In addition, once it is recognized that this
right is a proprietary property right, rather than a personal right, permitting
publicity rights to descend will follow.
Transfer Of Publicity Rights By Descent
If a celebrity's publicity rights, which conceivably took thousands of
hours and dollars to perfect and promote, are not descendible upon death,
they will fall into the public domain. Because the celebrity's heirs and
grantees will be unable to control commercialization of the publicity rights
exclusively, these valuable rights will not inure to their benefit. The reasons
that permit inter vivos transfer of publicity rights may, however, also
enable courts to logically substantiate the survival and descent of publicity
rights at the time of the celebrity's death. Furthermore, the descent of such
rights does not conflict with any overriding public interest, such as the in-
terest in first amendment freedoms of speech and press.
The factors that support the termination of publicity rights upon death
involve the forfeiture of a recognized and valuable property right and
should, therefore, be strictly analyzed and narrowly construed. In its
simplest form, the descent issue involves a balancing of various societal in-
terests. Considerations include whether permitting descent of publicity
rights affects the public, whether descent hinders first amendment
150. Miller v. Universal Pictures Co., 11 A.D.2d 47, 49, 201 N.Y.S.2d 632, 634 (1960),
modified, 13 A.D.2d 473, 214 N.Y.S.2d 645, aff'd mem., 10 N.Y.2d 972, 180 N.E.2d 248, 224
N.Y.S.2d 662 (1961).
151. See notes 52 & 53 and accompanying text supra.
152. See, e.g., Madison Square Garden Corp. v. Universal Pictures Co., 255 A.D. 459,
464, 7 N.Y.S.2d 845, 851-52 (1938) (owner of sports arena had property right in its reputa-
tion and goodwill in unfair competition action); Nimmer, supra note II, at 216. Compare
Groucho Marx Prods. v. Day & Night Co., 523 F. Supp. 485, 491 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (Marx
Brothers had property right in unique characters they created) and KGB, Inc. v. Giannoulas,
104 Cal. App. 3d 844, 854-55, 164 Cal. Rptr. 571, 581-82 (1980) (discussion of performer's
proprietary claim to "antic chicken" routine he developed) with Lugosi v. Universal Pictures,
25 Cal. 3d 813, 818, 603 P.2d 425, 427, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323, 325 (1979) (Count Dracula char-
acter developed by another considered in the public domain).
153. Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 869 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953).
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freedoms, whether descent of publicity rights motivates celebrities to
achieve celebrity status, and who best deserves to enjoy the fruits of a
celebrity's labors.
Those wishing to defeat the survival of publicity rights urge that, like the
right of privacy, the right of publicity is essentially personal in nature.
Because the right to publicity concerns attributes that are personal to the
celebrity and that physically cease upon the celebrity's death, the right to
publicize those attributes should similarly terminate. Consequently, the per-
sonal attributes of the deceased celebrity would be placed in the public do-
main. '
As noted herein, however, the personal nature and nonsurvival aspects of
the right of privacy are simply not germane to the right of publicity.'" The
policy underlying the right of privacy is to prevent undue mental suffering.
In contrast, the underlying reasons for protecting publicity rights are to
enable the celebrity to be free from unauthorized commercialization and to
prevent unjust enrichment. Although a celebrity's feelings cannot be
separated from the person and, therefore, terminate at death, a celebrity's
personal attributes are separable and can readily continue after his death,
particularly if these attributes are connected with commercial products. The
commercial value of these attributes continues and often increases after the
celebrity's death. Thus, when a person dies, the underlying reasons for
recognizing and protecting publicity rights remain compelling.
State Interests In Survival Of Publicity Rights
Perhaps the most important reason for permitting the descent of publicity
rights is that certain societal interests would be advanced. '56 First, states
desire personas to strive to achieve celebrity status. The public benefits
from the many forms of entertainment and newsworthy events that such
achievement provides. Nevertheless, the full encouragement of such crea-
tivity requires more than just state recognition and protection of publicity
rights during the celebrity's lifetime. The celebrity must be assured that he
is creating a valuable, proprietary property interest that will descend to his
heirs or business grantees. Such assurance may cause the celebrity to strive
harder to create the most unique and valuable persona that his talents and
resources will permit. Any additional development of a celebrity's persona,
154. See Memphis Dev. Found. v. Factors, Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956, 960 (6th Cir.) (publicity
rights of the dead should be regarded as a "common asset" to be shared by all), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 953 (1980).
155. See notes 83-105 and accompanying text supra. See also Lombardo v. Doyle, Dane &
Bernbach, Inc., 58 A.D.2d 620, 621, 396 N.Y.S.2d 661, 664 (1977) (dictum) ("[w]hile a cause
of action under the [privacy section of the New York] Civil Rights Law is not assignable dur-
ing one's lifetime and terminates at death, the right to publicity, i.e., the property right to
one's name, photograph and image, is under no such inhibition.").
156. See Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 839-40, 603 P.2d 425, 441-42, 160
Cal. Rptr. 323, 339-40 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
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albeit for the purpose of passing on a valuable asset to his heirs, is of
benefit to the public. Furthermore, the celebrity's development of extensive
publicity rights is no different than a person's development of a substantial
estate. Both expect and intend to pass on substantial and valuable property
interests to their heirs.' In addition, if a celebrity believes that he is not
adequately providing for his heirs and business associates, he might pursue
other business interests rather than strive to propel his image to the highest
possible level. Thus, not only does the public's recognition of the persona
subside, but artistic creativity is not encouraged or sustained.
Second, the state has an interest in allowing the celebrity to fully
recognize the fruits of his efforts. To view the descent question in its proper
context, it must be remembered that, ordinarily, the celebrity goes through
years of hard effort to develop a marketable commodity. Only after such
sacrifice, and often near the end of a celebrity's life, does a celebrity
typically begin to reap his just reward. Thus, the only way that a celebrity
can fully realize the economic potential of his efforts is to devise his
publicity rights to those whom he wishes to benefit. Absent countervailing
public interests, the question becomes whether the heirs and grantees or the
public should exclusively enjoy the celebrity's valuable publicity rights after
his death.
Advertisers, novelty manufacturers, and personal merchandisers, rather
than individual members of the public, are particularly interested in this ex-:
clusive enjoyment. If, at a celebrity's death, such businesses are freely
allowed to enjoy that which was previously obtained by paying large sums,
they receive a substantial windfall. The public, however, does not substan-
tially benefit when publicity rights fall into the public domain upon a
celebrity's death. For example, during a celebrity's life, the first amendment
grants to both the public and commercial enterprises the right to portray a
celebrity's attributes in a newsworthy context. Regardless of whether
publicity rights are permitted to survive, the public will continue to have ac-
cess to newsworthy and historical information about the persona after his
death.'" Moreover, survival of publicity rights places potential users of
these rights in the same position they are in prior to a celebrity's death.
These potential users of a persona's rights still must obtain a release before
they can use the persona's attributes.
157. It is for this very reason that celebrities are known to include specific bequests of their
publicity rights in their wills, and to contract with others for commercialization of their
publicity rights for the benefit of their heirs. See Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F. Supp.
426, 429-30 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836, 838-39
(S.D.N.Y. 1975).
158. See Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F. Supp. 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (court allowed
publication of fictionalized account of a true incident in a deceased famous writer's life);
Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 25 Cal. 3d 860, 868, 603 P.2d 454, 459, 160 Cal. Rptr.
352, 357 (1979) (Bird, C.J., concurring) (fictional account of portion of life of Rudolph Valen-
tino entitled to constitutional protection); Frosch v. Grosset & Dunlap, Inc., 75 A.D.2d 768,
769, 427 N.Y.S.2d 828, 829 (1980) (book concerning a deceased actress was characterized as a
literary work, thus entitled to first amendment protection).
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In sum, no logical reasons exist for permitting an advertiser to receive a
windfall when a celebrity dies. Rather, the celebrity's heirs and grantees,
because of their personal or financial interest in the celebrity's publicity
rights, should be entitled to exclusive enjoyment of the financial benefits
flowing from the celebrity's efforts. The heirs and grantees, rather than an
unrelated commercial concern, have a greater nexus to the deceased cele-
brity's property rights.' 9
JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF THE DESCENT ISSUE
The personal attributes that constitute a celebrity's right of publicity are
inherently capable of being separated from their owner and placed under
the exclusive use and control of another.' 6 As the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit stated:
We think that, in addition to and independent of that right of privacy ..
a man has a right in the publicity value of his photograph, i.e., the right
to grant the exclusive privilege of publishing his picture, and that such a
grant may validly be made 'in gross,' i.e., without an accompanying
transfer of a business or of anything else.'
6'
Because publicity rights can be transferred in gross during the celebrity's
life as a fully alienable property right, a corollary issue has arisen as to
159. It is also unclear why the treatment of the publicity rights of a deceased personality,
who leaves his publicity rights to his heirs, should be any different from that of a personality
who earned fame some 20 or 30 years earlier and then faded from the public view only to have
his publicity rights violated at a later date. Nevertheless, relief has been granted in the latter
situation. See Ettore v. Philco Television Broadcasting Corp., 229 F.2d 481 (3d Cir. 1956)
(television broadcast of old prize fight without fighter's consent). In either case, it is the misap-
propriation of a hard earned property right that must be prevented, not injury to feelings.
160. See notes 146-51 and accompanying text supra.
161. Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953). As to judicial recognition of such transfers, see Price v. Hal
Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836, 843-44 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (court acknowledged with ap-
proval the Haelan Laboratories court's recognition of exclusive rights in commercial exploita-
tion of publicity rights), and Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Urban Sys., 72 Misc. 2d 788, 340
N.Y.S.2d 144 (court recognized that Howard Hughes gave a valid exclusive assignment of the
right to exploit his name and personality), modified, 42 A.D.2d 544, 345 N.Y.S.2d 17 (1973).
The transfer of publicity rights is treated differently than a transfer in gross of trademark
rights. To prevent any confusion of the public, the elements of a business or the goodwill with
which a trademark is associated must also be assigned. In connection with licensing, the ex-
clusive licensees of publicity rights should be considered to have standing to sue for any in-
terferences with their licensor's identity, assuming the interference falls within the scope of
their license. Likewise, it may be presumed that a nonexclusive publicity right licensee, for
many of the same reasons that preclude a nonexclusive trademark or patent licensee, would not
have the requisite standing to sue infringers. In these instances, the celebrity should be joined
as a co-plaintiff. Compare Quabaug Rubber Co. v. Fabiano Shoe Co. 567 F.2d 154 (1st Cir.
1977) (nonexclusive licensee; standing denied) with Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Kasser
Distillers Prods. Corp., 350 F. Supp. 1341 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (wholly owned subsidiary of
trademark owner was exclusive user of trademark; standing granted), aff'd, 480 F.2d 917 (3d
Cir. 1973).
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whether those rights can descend at the time of the celebrity's death.
Although publicity rights have all the essential attributes of property, in-
cluding transfer to and enforcement by third parties, case law has revealed
that this important question has not been treated uniformly.
Cases Allowing Descent
Until recently, few cases directly discussed the descent of the right of
publicity.' 6 1 Over the last several years, however, the descent of publicity
rights has been recognized.' 3 This recognition has been based primarily on
the proprietary property aspect of the right of publicity whereas the nonsur-
vival of privacy rights is based on the personal nature of that right.
A recent decision that recognized the descent of publicity rights is Fac-
tors, Etc., Inc. v. Creative Card Co. 164 In brief, the popular singer, Elvis
Presley, had assigned all the rights to use his name and likeness to a cor-
poration he formed. After Presley's death, this corporation granted an ex-
clusive sublicense to merchandise the Elvis Presley persona to the
plaintiff.161 This case considered the plaintiff's attempts to enjoin the sales
of souvenir posters manufactured by the defendant.
In its analysis, the Creative Card court reviewed Prosser's four distinct
privacy actions,' 6 noting that the basis for each action was the protection
of one's right to be let alone. Yet, the court noted that Prosser's fourth cat-
egory failed to recognize that misappropriation of a person's attributes has
different consequences for a well known celebrity than for a private person.
162. One early case in which the misappropriation aspect-as opposed to the injury to feel-
ings aspect-of the right of privacy was expressly considered was Schuyler v. Curtis, 147 N.Y.
434, 42 N.E. 22 (1895). That case concerned the public exhibition of a statue of a deceased
philanthropist. It was held that the right of privacy, as it concerned the right to prevent the
public from making pictures or statues commemorative of the services of a person, did not sur-
vive after death and could not be enforced by relatives of the deceased.
Another case which indirectly touched on the descent question is Miller v. Commissioner,
299 F.2d 706 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 370 U.S. 923 (1962). The court held that for income tax
purposes, neither Glenn Miller nor his heirs held a property right in the story of Glenn Miller's
life. However, that case was limited to the specific capital gains issue; it was not concerned
with whether publicity rights, once established, could be transferred at the celebrity's death.
163. See Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F. Supp. 426, 430 (S.DN.Y. 1978) ("it seems
clear . . . that [Agatha Christie's] right of publicity survived her death and was properly
transferred to the plaintiffs as her heirs and assignees"); Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400
F. Supp. 836, 844 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (court recognized the publicity rights of the comedy team
of Laurel and Hardy as a property right that is descendible). See also Lombardo v. Doyle,
Dane & Bernbach, Inc., 58 A.D.2d 620, 621, 396 N.Y.S.2d 661, 664 (1977) (descendibility of
publicity rights recognized in dicta),
164. 444 F. Supp. 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). "It appears that a recognized property right, the
'right of publicity,' inhered in and was exercised by Elvis Presley in his lifetime, that it was
assignable by him and was so assigned, that it survived his death and was capable of further
assignment." Id. at 282.
165. Id. at 281.
166. See note 85 supra.
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In those situations when a private citizen has made no attempt to commer-
cialize his personality, courts should concentrate on emotions, feelings, and
other personal aspects. In contrast, the court observed that when a cele-
brity's persona has become a product in and of itself through substantial
commercialization, courts should consider the misappropriation of that
product to be similar to unfair competition or theft of goodwill rather than
to the invasion of the right to be let alone.'16
The court then addressed the question of whether publicity rights could
descend. Relying on the reasoning established in Price v. Hal Roach Stu-
dios, Inc., 6 the Creative Card court could find no public policy reasons
that cut off the right of publicity at a celebrity's death. The court con-
cluded that there was "no reason why the valuable right of
publicity--clearly exercised by and financially benefiting Elvis Presley in
life-should not descend at death like any other intangible property
right.'1
6 9
The Creative Card court's analysis was applied in the companion case of
Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc. ,7I to initially enjoin the defendant from
distributing its Presley posters.'' The Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit affirmed the district court's order, noting that the issue of duration of
publicity rights was one of state law.' 72 The Second Circuit held that, by
making a valid assignment of his publicity rights to a third party, Presley
had:
carved out a separate intangible property right for himself, the right to a
certain percentage of the royalties which would be realized by [Presley's
exclusive licensee] upon exploitation of Presley's likeness and name. The
identification of this exclusive right belonging to [Presley's exclusive
licensee] as a transferable property right compels the conclusion that the
right survives Presley's death. The death of Presle/y, who was merely the
beneficiary of an income interest in [Presley's licensee's] exclusive right,
should not in itself extinguish [that licensee's] pr perty right. Instead, the
income interest, continually produced from [the licensee's] exclusive right
of commercial exploitation, should inure to Presley's estate at death like
any other intangible property right. To hold that the right did not survive
Presley's death, would-be-to grant competitors of [Presley's publicity right
sublicensees], such as [the defendants], a windfall in the form of profits
from the use of Presley's name and likeness. At the same time, the ex-
clusive right purchased by [Presley's sublicensees] and the financial
benefits accruing to the celebrity's heirs would be rendered virtually
worthless. ' "
167. 444 F. Supp. at 283.
168. 400 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
169. 444 F. Supp. at 284 (emphasis in original).
170. 444 F. Supp. 288 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd, 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440
U.S. 908 (1979).
171. 444 F. Supp. at 292.
172. 579 F.2d at 220.
173. Id. at 221.
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After disposing of the survival question in favor of Presley's heirs and
grantees, the Second Circuit also rejected the defendant's contention that its
poster celebrated a newsworthy event. The court disagreed that the first
amendment protected the use of the dates of Presley's birth and death
along with the legend "IN MEMORY" as newsworthy information.' 74 Fol-
lowing the United States Supreme Court's denial of certiorari,'" the district
court in Pro Arts granted the plaintiff's motion for a permanent injunc-
tion.' 76 In doing so, the court rejected the contentions that cases in other
jurisdictions had eliminated the precedential validity of decisions originally
relied upon by the court,' 7 that federal copyright law preempted the plain-
tiff's right of publicity," ' and that the defendant's actions were constitu-
tionally privileged.'"
174. Id. at 222. The defendant argued that the poster was protected as newsworthy on the
basis of Paulsen v. Personality Posters, Inc., 59 Misc. 2d 444, 299 N.Y.S.2d 501 (1968). In
Paulsen, a corporation was not enjoined from distributing posters of a comedian posing as a
mock presidential candidate since the comedian's choice of satirizing within the political arena
rendered him newsworthy under the first amendment. As noted by the district court in Factors
Etc., Inc. v. Creative Card Co., 444 F. Supp. 279, 285 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), however, "[t]he
Paulsen case was held unique to its facts" a few years after its decision by the very court that
decided it. See Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Urban Sys., 72 Misc. 2d 788, 340 N.Y.S.2d 144,
modified, 42 A.D.2d 544, 345 N.Y.S.2d 17 (1973).
175. 440 U.S. 908 (1979).
176. 496 F. Supp. 1090 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). The permanent injunction specifically prohibited
the defendants from:
(1) manufacturing, selling or distributing any and all posters, reproductions, or
copies identical or similar to the "IN MEMORY" poster; (2) manufacturing, sell-
ing or distributing any other posters, reproductions, or copies containing any im-
age, picture, or likeness of Elvis Presley; and, (3) utilizing for commercial profit in
any manner or form the name, image, photograph, or likeness of Elvis Presley
other than pursuant to an agreement approved by the plaintiffs.
496 F. Supp. at 1104.
177. Id. at 1093-94. See Memphis Dev. Found. v. Factors, Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir.
1980); Lugosi v. Universal Pictures Co., 172 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 541 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1972),
rev'd, 70 Cal. App. 3d 552, 139 Cal. Rptr. 35 (1977), aff'd, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 603 P.2d 425, 160
Cal. Rptr. 323 (1979).
178. 496 F. Supp. at 1095-1100. The defendant argued that the right of publicity was pre-
empted by federal copyright laws since the right is equivalent to the exclusive rights protected
by the copyright statute and thus the right of publicity is to be governed exclusively by the
copyright laws. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 102, 106, 301 (Supp. II 1979).
The district court analyzed the legislative history of the copyright statute and reasoned that
since Congress intended to preserve the common law right of publicity, there was no pre-
emption by federal copyright laws. The court further noted that "[t]he plaintiff's prior right
to exploit the Presley name and image cannot be defeated by the defendants' attempt to
copyright individual items." 496 F. Supp. at 1100.
179. 496 F. Supp. at 1100. The author recognizes that the Pro Arts case has been reversed
on appeal. Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 652 F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102
S.Ct. 1973 (1982). This reversal, however, was based on choice of law principles that had not
been discussed in the prior litigation. Applying the "significant contacts" test from Babcock v.
Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963), the Second Circuit con-
cluded that Tennessee rather than New York law should have been applied. The Second Circuit
then decided that deference should be given to the Sixth Circuit's decision in Memphis Dev.
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Through the Presley cases, the Second Circuit has presented a proper
analysis of the descent issue.18 In summary, the courts that have recognized
descent of publicity rights have 1) noted the distinctions between the right
of publicity and right of privacy; 2) examined the policies for recognizing
such distinctions; 3) determined that first amendment rights are not violated
when a defendant is prohibited from distributing non-newsworthy items
that involve a celebrity's publicity rights; 4) reasoned that the right of
publicity does not conflict with federal copyright laws; and 5) concluded
that the societal interests involved in encouraging the creation of unique
personas were more important than allowing the defendant to obtain a
windfall. In contrast to the cases discussed in the following section, the
analysis is the pro-descent cases was conducted without any makeweight ex-




Lugosi v. Universal Pictures Co. 1"' is an example of an opinion that re-
fused to recognize descent due to projected "fears" that would result if
publicity rights were descendible. In Lugosi, the heirs of the actor Bela
Lugosi sought injunctive relief from the unauthorized commercialization of
his name and likeness in the form of the Count Dracula character. The trial
Found. v. Factors, Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980), in
which it was held that Presley's right of publicity did not survive his death. Even though the
court hinted that it would uphold descent if it had originally decided the issue under New York
law, the Second Circuit believed it was compelled to 'follow Memphis Development Foundation
because Tennessee is within the Sixth Circuit. 652 F.2d at 283.
It must be noted, however, that the reversal of the Pro Arts case has not had a significant
impact on subsequent cases. New York and New Jersey still clearly view the right of publicity
to be descendible. See Groucho Marx Prods. v. Day & Night Co., 523 F. Supp. 485 (S.D.N.Y.
1981) (publicity rights of Marx Brothers held to have descended to trustee under will of Harpo
Marx in infringement suit against producers of musical play); Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513
F. Supp. 1339 (D.N.J. 1981) (Elvis Presley's publicity rights became part of his estate after his
death). Indeed, a Tennessee court has ruled that the Sixth Circuit's opinion in Memphis
Development Foundation was "irreconcilable with this Court's decision that the right of pub-
licity is descendible and the majority view on this issue." Commerce Union Bank v. Coors of
the Cumberland, Inc., No. 81-1252-III (Tenn. Ch. October 2, 1981) (publicity rights of Lester
Flatt held to have descended to executors of Flatt's estate in suit for unauthorized use of
Flatt's likeness in advertisements).
180. Contrary to the Creative Card and Pro Arts decisions, there should be no requirement
of active exploitation of a celebrity's persona, separate and apart from his main field of
endeavors, to substantiate the valid descent of publicity rights. Rather, it should only be re-
quired that the celebrity be shown to have a more popular status than that of the average
citizen, thereby giving rise to the creation of a marketable persona having commercial value.
See notes 206-13 and accompanying text infra.
181. 172 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 541 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1972), rev'd, 70 Cal. App. 3d 552, 139 Cal.
Rptr. 35 (1977), aff'd, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 603 P.2d 425, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1979).
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court held that Lugosi had reserved the merchandising rights in his name
and likeness by not granting them in any of the movie contracts he had en-
tered. The court determined that these reserved merchandising rights were
of property nature and therefore were descendible to and protectible by
Lugosi's heirs.' 2 The trial court clearly viewed the unauthorized use of a
persona's name, likeness, or personality as an invasion of a property right
that results in pecuniary loss, rather than as an invasion of the right to be
let alone.' 83
The trial court decision, however, was reversed."" In affirming the rever-
sal," the California Supreme Court ruled that for Lugosi's publicity rights
to be recognized as property for descent purposes, he must have actually
used his name and likeness during his life in a business venture or on goods
or services. If Lugosi had used his name to "impress such business, prod-
uct, or service with a secondary meaning," the court continued, his pub-
licity rights would then be protected under unfair competition laws."'
Alternatively, those rights also would be protected if Lugosi had brought
suit to restrain their unauthorized use. Either course of action was a per-
sonal assertion deemed necessary for publicity rights to have property
status. The mere notion to tie a celebrity's name to a business or product
was not sufficient; the court required an actual application of that
notion." 7 Indeed, the cases relied on by the trial court which found that
name and likeness is a descendible property right"' were distinguished by
the supreme court in that the celebrities in those cases had actually assigned
those rights during their lifetime. The court regarded such assignments as
synonymous with the owner's personal exercise whereas the attempt by
Lugosi's heirs to exploit his name was "not the exercise of that right by the
person entitled to it.'"'s9
In addition, as another example of the ongoing confusion between the
right of privacy and the right of publicity, the California Supreme Court
182. 172 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 551.
183. Id.
184. 70 Cal. App. 3d 552, 139 Cal. Rptr. 35 (1977).
185. 25 Cal. 3d 813, 603 P.2d 425, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1979).
186. Id. at 818, 603 P.2d at 428, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 326.
187. Id. at 819, 603 P.2d at 428, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 326.
188. Cepeda v. Swift & Co., 415 F.2d 1205 (8th Cir. 1969); Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps
Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953); Uhlaender v.
Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277 (D. Minn. 1970). The California Supreme Court discussed three
cases which it considered supportive of its non-descent rule. These cases are inapposite,
however, as they are either right of privacy cases brought by the heirs of criminals or cases
where no actual inheritance of publicity rights could be asserted. Maritote v. Desilu Prods.,
345 F.2d 418 (7th Cir.) (right of privacy action based on appropriation of Al Capone's name
and personality denied), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 883 (1965); James v. Screen Gems, Inc., 174
Cal. App. 2d 650, 344 P.2d 799 (1959) (right of privacy action brought by widow of Jesse
James, Jr. denied); Schumann v. Loew's, Inc., 135 N.Y.S.2d 361 (1954) (plaintiffs lacked stan-
ding for publicity rights action).
189. 25 Cal. 3d at 823, 603 P.2d at 431, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 329 (emphasis in original).
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determined that a celebrity's "right of value ' ' 90 is a personal right em-
braced in the law of privacy. Thus, like privacy rights, the right of value
can be protected during one's life, but not after one's death. If this right
was exploited during life and transformed into a separate property right,
only that property right alone descends. To support its decision, the court
projected "fears" that would manifest themselves if publicity rights were
allowed to descend. First, the court asked whether remote descendants
should be allowed to obtain damages for unauthorized commercial uses of
the names of their distinguished ancestors. It also questioned whether
publicity rights have an ultimate duration and, if so, whether courts are the
proper body to determine that duration. ' 9'
The descent of publicity rights also was viewed unfavorably in Memphis
Development Foundation v. Factors, Etc., Inc. '92 This case involved a de-
claratory judgment action brought by a nonprofit foundation that wished to
sell miniature statues of Elvis Presley to fund the building of a com-
memorative Presley statue. The district court recognized that publicity
rights, primarily because of their inherent property aspects, were separate
and distinct from privacy rights.' 93 Noting an absence of Tennessee deci-
sions in this area, the lower court reasoned that other well reasoned cases
would most likely protect Presley's publicity rights under unfair competi-
tion, unjust enrichment, or misappropriation of goodwill theories. In grant-
ing the injunction, the court concluded that relevant authority had deter-
mined that the right of publicity should be inheritable and assignable,
especially when these rights are commercially exploited during the
celebrity's life.94
190. The right of value discussed by the court includes the celebrity's personal decisions to
exploit name and likeness, to capitalize upon personality, and to transfer the value thereof into
a commercial venture. Id. at 822, 603 P.2d at 430, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 328. See also PROSSER,
supra note 12, at 807.
191. 25 Cal. 3d at 822, 603 P.2d at 430, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 328. Chief Justice Bird, joined by
two colleagues, filed a lengthy dissent. The dissenting justices outlined the substantial dif-
ferences between personal rights under privacy law and commercial rights of a pecuniary
nature under publicity law. They concluded that the right of publicity should be descendible,
stating that:
The right is capable of assignment. It is equally clear that the right may be passed
to one's heirs or beneficiaries upon the individual's death. In considering the ques-
tion of the right's descendibility, it must be remembered that what is at issue is the
proprietary interest in the value of one's name and likeness in commercial enter-
prises, not a personal right like the right of privacy.
Id. at 845-46, 603 P.2d at 445, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 343 (Bird, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis in
original). The dissenters also believed that the right of publicity need not be exercised during
life to be descendible. They did conclude, however, that the encouragement of creativity does
not require perpetual protection of publicity rights. In the absence of legislative durational
guidelines, they determined that, as a policy decision, the protection of a celebrity's publicity
rights for 50 years after his death was sufficient. Id. at 846-48, 603 P.2d at 446-47, 160 Cal.
Rptr. at 344-45.
192. 441 F. Supp. 1323 (W.D. Tenn. 1977), aff'd men., 578 F.2d 1381 (6th Cir. 1978),
rev'd, 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980).
193. 441 F. Supp. at 1330.
194. Id.
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The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the trial court's is-
suance of an injunction.'19 On the appeal of the trial court's order granting
Factor's motion for summary judgment, however, the Sixth Circuit reversed
and ruled that publicity rights do not descend, even when the persona, while
living, exploited those rights, through contractual agreements.' 9 6 The
Sixth Circuit noted only two of the many societal interests in recognizing a
post-mortem right of publicity-the encouragement of creativity and the ex-
pectation of creating a valuable capital asset.19' Yet, the court asserted that
the personal desire to achieve success, bring happiness to others, and reap
financial rewards were the main reasons that inspire persons to become
celebrities. The desire to commercialize their fame for the benefit of their
heirs or to pursue additional creative endeavors, the court observed, were
substantially weaker motivating factors. 9 9 Finally, the appellate court noted
what it deemed to be strong reasons for not recognizing descent:
A whole set of practical problems of judicial line-drawing would arise
should the courts recognize such an inheritable right. How long would the
"property" interest last? In perpetuity? For a term of years? Is the right
of publicity taxable? At what point does the right collide with the right of
free expression guaranteed by the first amendment? Does the right apply
to elected officials and military heroes whose fame' was gained on the
public payroll, as well as to movie stars, singers and athletes? Does the
right cover posters or engraved likenesses of, for example, Farah Fawcett
Majors or Mahatma Gandhi, kitchen utensils ("Revere Ware"), insurance
("John Hancock"), electric utilities ("Edison"), a football stadium
("RFK"), a pastrly ("Napoleon"), or the innumerable urban subdivisions
and apartment complexes named after famous people?"'
Critique of the "Fears" Approach
The reasoning in both Lugosi and Memphis Development Foundation for
prohibiting survival of publicity rights does not withstand proper analysis.
Property principles should govern the duration of the right of publicity.200
Accordingly, the right of publicity should continue indefinitely or, at the
minimum, until abandoned through nonuse. In either case, the right re-
mains subject to first amendment rights.
The death of the celebrity does not extinguish the reasons for establishing
a proprietary property interest in the right of publicity. Because personal at-
tributes can be separated from the celebrity and are transferable during life
in the form of publicity rights, the attributes remain equally separable after
his death. Similarly, the value of a deceased celebrity's publicity rights
195. 578 F.2d 1381 (6th Cir. 1978).
196. 616 F.2d 956, 958 (6th Cir. 1980).
197. Id. The court made no mention, however, of other important societal interests that
could be vindicated by permitting survival of publicity rights. See text accompanying notes
156-59 supra.
198. 616 F.2d at 959.
199. Id.
200. See notes 138-53 and accompanying text supra.
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usually continues after his death. In fact, the possibility of increased ex-
posure after death, through either licensed commercializations or privileged
newsworthy disseminations, may substantially increase the fame, public
recognition, and awareness of the persona. Thus, because of the value and
capability of continued separate existence, the publicity rights of a deceased
celebrity do, can, and should continue.
Furthermore, descent of publicity rights will not hamper the public's
quest for or supply of information concerning a celebrity. The public will
continue to be able to admire the celebrity and to receive privileged
newsworthy information about him through the media. The public will be
unable to purchase or manufacture commercial products only of a non-
newsworthy nature. But even this minimal limitation might be removed if
the celebrity's heirs or grantees authorize the use of the celebrity's persona.
The protection of publicity rights after death against unauthorized in-
terference with these rights does not conflict with the first amendment. The
two interests are mutually exclusive in this context. The use of a celebrity's
picture and name on merchandise, such as on a child's lunchbox, does not
deprive the public of newsworthy information or impair informed decision
making. Society's paramount interest in the free dissemination of ideas and
newsworthy information will continue under first amendment principles
despite recognition of the descent of publicity rights.
In addition, the descent issue is unaffected by the determination of
whether publicity rights are taxable. If the heirs or grantees must pay taxes,
the taxes will be passed on to the grantees or ultimately to the consumers in
the form of higher royalties resulting in higher sales prices. The few tax
cases that have addressed the issue, however, have decided that the right of
publicity is not property within the narrow definitions of the tax laws.2"'
Sale of publicity rights, therefore, is not considered to be a sale of a capital
asset.
The Sixth Circuit's dicta in Memphis Development Foundation ob-
fuscated the descent issue in its discussion of whether elected officials,
military heroes, and public employees who gain fame are entitled to ex-
clusive publicity rights.2" ' The real issue is whether such people can develop
protectible publicity rights rather than whether these publicity rights, once
developed, can descend at death. If such persons are entitled to protectible
publicity rights during life, and the few cases in this area indicate they
are,2"3 their rights should descend as any other celebrity's. Their status as
public employees does not change the nature of their publicity rights. In
201. E.g., Miller v. Commissioner, 299 F.2d 706, 709 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 923
(1962); Runyon v, United States, 281 F.2d 590, 592 (5th Cir. 1960).
202. See text accompanying note 199 supra.
203. E.g., Continental Optical Co. v. Reed, 119 Ind. App. 643, 86 N.E.2d 306 (1949). In
Continental Optical, a member of an Army optical unit in World War II whose picture was
circulated by the Army for the war effort, was granted relief on an appropriation of property
rights claim against unauthorized use of his likeness for commercial purposes.
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any event, such hypothetical fact situations should be tried when actually
before a court, not when anticipated.
As to the Sixth Circuit's concern over purely commercial uses of publicity
rights, such as souvenir posters, there is no question that such rights should
prevail, even after a celebrity's death. Further, single uses of publicity rights
for commemorative statues, engraved likenesses, or public structures named
after the famous are either for the public interest or are newsworthy
statements. In such public interest cases, a celebrity's right of publicity must
properly yield to the first amendment.""4
Finally, it is highly questionable that an existing use of the publicity
rights of famous persons, who are long since deceased, could now be en-
joined. Generally, the heirs involved have abandoned any claims to their
distant relatives' publicity rights by allowing uses of their relatives' names
or likeness to go unchallenged." 5 A completely different rule should apply,
however, when considering the publicity rights of recently deceased
celebrities. Because abandonment has presumably not yet occurred, the
heirs or grantees should be able to prevent any unauthorized, purely com-
mercial use.
The Sixth Circuit's opinion in Memphis Development Foundation and the
California Supreme Court's opinion in Lugosi display a lack of understand-
ing of the underlying societal interests involved in recognizing and protect-
ing the right of publicity and of the distinction between the right of
publicity and the right of privacy and the property nature of publicity
rights. The opinions confuse the commercial use of publicity rights on con-
sumer products with the public's perception of celebrity's attributes and
fame. These decisions further fail to recognize that the public's thirst for in-
formation concerning the celebrity will continue to be supplied by privileged
media disseminations regardless of whether publicity rights survive.
REQUIREMENT OF EXPLOITATION DURING LIFE
In addition to the "fears" approach, another method of limiting the
descendability of publicity rights has been to first consider whether the
celebrity personally used, exercised, or licensed his publicity rights during
his life."0 ' Those proposing this threshold question have explained that the
204. See notes 128-37 and accompanying text supra.
205. Cf. Sobel, Count Dracula and the Right of Publicity, 47 L.A. BAR Ass'N BULL. 373,
403-04 (1972) (heirs of Abraham Lincoln or Benjamin Franklin would have no cause of action
for commercial use of those names).
206. See Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F. Supp. 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) ("exploitation"
by author Agatha Christie achieved through production of movies and plays based on her
books); Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 288 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd, 579
F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978) ("exploitation" by Elvis Presley through creation of independent entity
to merchandise his persona), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979). But see Price v. Hal Roach
Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (actual exploitation not necessary to protect
right of publicity from use by other if celebrity established unique persona). See generally
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right of publicity is only a protectible property right if the celebrity com-
mercially exploited one of his personal attributes. Thus, these courts first
determine whether there had been a personal, overt act that represented a
formal acknowledgement of ownership by the celebrity. Such acknowledge-
ments include authorization of the sale of premium merchandise, issuance
of licenses for collateral products, granting of assignments to third parties,
bequest of publicity rights by testamentary disposition, or initiation of suit
to restrain unauthorized uses. Even the adequacy of the celebrity's exploita-
tion has been questioned, namely, may the overt act be merely an exploita-
tion by the celebrity in connection with the type of activity or endeavors for
which he is publicly known, or must it be by means of an independent com-
mercial commodity such as an unrelated collateral product or service.
The courts have not addressed the exploitation issue consistently. For ex-
ample, in Hicks v. Casablanca Records," 7 the court determined that to
state a successful claim for infringement of publicity rights, the claimant
must prove that the decedent celebrity recognized the commercial value of
his or her name or likeness and that such recognition was manifested in an
overt manner." 8 Hicks held that a celebrity's transfer of publicity rights or
a bequest of publicity rights by testamentary disposition was sufficient ex-
ploitation to enable those rights to survive his death. Courts and commen-
tators that follow this collateral exploitation rule maintain that a celebrity's
failure to exercise his right of publicity in a separate commercial setting pre-
vents descent for two reasons. Such failure either operates as an abandon-
ment of that right upon his death or prevents the value of that right to be
transferred into a business venture which can then descend as property."'
In contrast, other courts that have considered the exploitation issue have
declared that a celebrity's publicity rights are protectible when the
celebrity's unique persona has been created and established through hard
work, skill, and the expenditure of time and money."' Under this nominal
exploitation theory, a right of publicity is protectible for purposes of des-
cent if it can be shown that the celebrity established a secondary meaning
and value in his unique persona for which others would pay or seek to ap-
Rader, The "Right of Publicity"-A New Dimension, 61 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 228 (1979) (noting
that although exploitation is required it has never been clearly defined).
207. 464 F. Supp. 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
208. Id. at 429-30. Cf. Martin Luther King, Jr. Center for Social Change, Inc. v. American
Heritage Prods., 508 F. Supp. 854 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (modest sums received in form of
honorarium for use of name and likeness in literary compositions does not amount to commer-
cial exploitation during lifetime).
209. See Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 819, 821-24, 603 P.2d 425, 428,
430-31, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323, 326, 328-29 (1979).
210. See, e.g., Groucho Marx Prods. v. Day & Night Co., 523 F. Supp. 485, 491 (S.D.N.Y.
1981) (no question of intent to capitalize on commercial value of artificial Personalities created
for entertainment purposes); Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836, 846
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) (once persona developed there is no "necessity to exercise the right of public-
ity during one's life in order to protect it from use by others to preserve any potential right of
one's heirs").
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propriate. Accordingly, actual exploitation of collateral products during the
celebrity's life is not required for descent of publicity rights.
The nominal exploitation theory is more preferable than the collateral ex-
ploitation theory for several reasons. First, a celebrity may not wish to
commercially exploit his publicity rights. 2 ' For example, a celebrity may
not wish to exploit his publicity rights until his reputation, name, and
likeness have reached their greatest potential value. If a celebrity purposely
waited to commercialize his persona on collateral products until it reached
its largest potential value, but died prematurely, the prerequisite of active
exploitation seems unduly harsh. Consequently, nonexercise of publicity
rights should not be assumed to be a decision never to exercise those
rights.2"2 Second, for various career-related or personal reasons, celebrities
may not desire to capitalize commercially on their names or other personal
attributes other than in their known fields of excellence." 3 Also, the value
of a celebrity's publicity rights may be enhanced by his premature death or
may not peak until after his death. The celebrity, therefore, may not have
exploited his publicity rights in order to create a legacy for his or her heirs.
Finally, it is illogical to disregard that the celebrity's initial development
and subsequent maintenance of his unique persona before the public, in and
of itself, acts as a sufficient exercise of his right of publicity for descent
purposes.
Certain of the societal interests underlying the right of publicity also
necessitate survival of a celebrity's publicity rights upon his death without
any requirement for active exploitation during life. State protection of the
right of publicity is intended to spur the creation of unique personas and
also to allow the celebrity to reap the financial rewards that flow from such
personas. Because the public has gained one more persona, it is irrelevant
whether the celebrity has also exploited his persona on various commercial
products or in other fields. The public would not be harmed by eliminating
the exploitation requirement for descent of publicity rights.
The exploitation issue is merely an attempt by courts and litigants to
disguise their failure to properly analyze the descent question. The exploita-
tion issue is overworked to appear as if descent has been factually analyzed.
Thus, the prerequisite of active exploitation during the celebrity's life
211. See, e.g., Grant v. Esquire, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 876, 880 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (persona's
announced renunciation of any desire to exploit the commercial value of his own name and
fame should not preclude his ability to enjoin others' unauthorized use).
212. To prove true abandonment at death, it should be required that the celebrity ceased
using or benefitting from his publicity rights as well as intended to purposely give them up
upon death. Thus, abandonment could not be proved where the celebrity maintained his public
image and popularity until his demise. The argument that nonexercise during life effects an
abandonment of publicity rights is also without merit when a comparison is made with the
rules for abandonment of a trademark. See I J. MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COM-
PETITION §§ 17.1-.10 (1973).
213. Cf. Palmer v. Schonhorn Enters., Inc., 96 N.J. Super. 72, 232 A.2d 458 (1967) (celeb-
rity's decision not to commercialize his publicity rights does not justify others to commercialize
them). See also note 34 supra.
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should be eliminated when determining whether publicity rights are descend-
ible.
LIMITS ON DESCENT OF PUBLICITY RIGHTS
Assuming the right of publicity is eventually granted property right status
and allowed to descend in all jurisdictions, several limitations are present
that will offset the full effects of descent, including abuse. One practical
limitation is the standing of publicity right plaintiffs. When a celebrity's
descendants are involved, a full proof of heirship is required and all or
substantially all of the celebrity's heirs must be joined in the action.2 1" This
threshold standing test acts to ensure that the ownership interest in a
celebrity's right of publicity is fully represented. Accordingly, this standing
problem will increase in magnitude as the number of years after the per-
sona's death increases. Thus, when remote descendants who are unable to
make an authentic proof of heirship bring suits, their cases will be subject
to dismissal.
As previously mentioned, the first amendment privileges of speech and
press also operate as a limitation on the descent of publicity rights. Even if
all descendants are found to have the requisite standing, the use of a
celebrity's attributes in a truly newsworthy setting, such as a fictionalized
biography, movie, or other medium conventionally used to disseminate
news, will remain privileged. 2"
The measure of damages will act as another limiting factor on the descent
of publicity rights. The amount of damages in publicity cases is based, in
part, on the value of the celebrity's attributes that have been appropriated.
In those cases where a deceased celebrity's attributes have either faded
substantially or have not been popularized over a long period of time, the
eventual monetary recovery would be nominal. Thus, in those situations,
there would be less of an incentive for descendants to file suit.
In addition, more direct limitations on descent have been suggested in the
form of various durational limits.2 '6 The primary reason suggested for such
214. See Schumann v. Loew's, Inc., 135 N.Y.S.2d 361, 369 (1954) (in claim for misappro-
priation of name of deceased famous composer, plaintiffs failed to show specific facts that
established they presently owned the property right to that name, that the deceased did not
otherwise dispose of that right in a will, or that they inherited that right under the intestate
succession laws of country of deceased).
215. As noted by Professor Nimmer, "[tJhere is no countervailing speech interest which
must be balanced against perpetual ownership of tangible real and personal property. There is
such a speech interest with respect to literary property, or copyright," thereby requiring limited
duration for such properties. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment
Guarantees of Free Speech and Press?, 17 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1180, 1193 (1970). Thus, since a
celebrity's right of publicity always remains subject to free speech interests, see notes 128-37
and accompanying text supra, there are no reasons why first amendment interests should limit
the duration on descent of publicity rights.
216. See, e.g., Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 847, 603 P.2d 425, 446-47,160
Cal. Rptr. 323, 345 (1979) (Bird, C.J., dissenting) (right of publicity should be recognized dur-
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limits is that in exchange for the celebrity's hard work to obtain celebrity
status and the resulting benefits to society, publicity rights should last long
enough to provide at least some economic protection for the celebrity's im-
mediate family and perhaps grandchildren. This presumably holds true for
the celebrity's grantees as well, as they undoubtedly would pay less for such
rights if they knew that the subject matter of their purchase could evaporate
without warning. Once these particular persons have reaped rewards during
a limited period following the celebrity's death, the argument continues,
free speech interests presumably increase to the point where they override
such limited property rights. At that time, the publicity rights enter the
public domain. This limited descent scheme, it is argued, would prevent a
celebrity's descendants or grantees from controlling history forever.
In determining what could be the appropriate length for such a limited
duration, the durational terms associated with real property, copyrights,
and trademarks, have been considered. For example, one commentator
reasoned that if duration is analyzed under trademark law, the right of
publicity would be protected for as long as the celebrity's name or picture is
attached or understood to relate to the persona himself. Thus, the right of
publicity would definitely last for the celebrity's life span. Yet, because the
celebrity's publicity attributes would become disembodied at death, the
publicity right and its value would then enter the public domain.2 '
The trademark analogy, however, has not been extended to its logical
conclusion. Because they are separable and have value, publicity rights
should, at the very least, survive for as long as they are associated with a
commercial product, service, or business venture which the deceased celebri-
ty's heirs or grantees have authorized. 2 ' Thus, it should be only at that
time when the heirs or grantees have intentionally ceased use of the celebri-
ty's attributes that the same should lose their protectible status and fall into
the public domain. It is only then that publicity rights should be considered
abandoned under trademark principles.
One problem with such an extended duration analogy under trademark
law, however, is that it would not give a distinct legal guideline to follow in
determining whether or not the publicity rights of a particular deceased per-
sonality are available for use. No certainty in publicity rights law would be
possible when protectible residual rights might remain in the personality's
publicity rights. Indeed, if yet another analogy were borrowed from the
trademark laws, the celebrity's heirs could undertake a nominal use and
sales program each year in an attempt to extend their rights. Such a "bank-
ing celebrity's life plus 50 years) (citing Note, The Right of Publicity-Protection for Public
Figures and Celebrities, 42 BROOKLYN L. REV. 527, 549 (1976) (durational limit should be two
generations after celebrity's death)); Dracula's Progeny, supra note 30, at 1124-28 (not ar-
bitrary to impose 50 year absolute durational limit).
217. Dracula's Progeny, supra note 30, at 1124 n.95.
218. It should also be noted that a trademark owned by a bankrupt corporation may repre-
sent continuing goodwill even though the corporation has ceased operations and its use of the
trademark. See 1 J. MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 17.2, 18.1 (1973).
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ing" of publicity rights would certainly frustrate any certainty in the law
whatsoever. For these reasons, a trademark analogy for the descent dura-
tion issue is not sound.
It has also been suggested that since the right of publicity is most like
copyright because they both spur the creation of original expressions, the
durational term for copyrights can be applied to a post-mortem right of
publicity. Such proponents argue that until any legislative action is taken on
the descent question, a reasonable duration limit is the celebrity's life plus
fifty years.21 9 It must be remembered, however, that the constitutional
copyright clause mandates a limited term for copyright.220 No such limita-
tion hampers the underlying basis for recognizing and protecting the right
of publicity.
Yet, none of the various proposals for arbitrarily selecting a durational
limit on descent truly protect the hard-earned value that resides in a celebri-
ty's unique persona. More importantly, none of the proposals recognize the
reasons for which the right of publicity was originally created, the property
nature of the right, or the state interests involved in its protection. If the
right of publicity is automatically terminated at a celebrity's death, a
valuable legacy is rendered valueless overnight. But the state interests in
protecting the right of publicity, as well as the celebrity's separate ongoing
attributes, continue after a celebrity's death. Thus, as long as one's publicity
rights have audience appeal and commercial value for which someone else
would pay, reasons remain to protect these rights. Further, since all
members of the public will continue to have privileges under the first
amendment, it cannot be seen what societal interest ever increases to the
point where it outweighs the heirs' or grantees' interests in the publicity
rights they own. It seems a rather harsh result tantamount to a taking of
property to have the right of publicity terminate upon the death of the per-
sonality to which it attaches. Thus, as suggested by other authors, there ap-
pear to be no logical reasons why the right of publicity, as a proprietary
property right, should not descend like other property, uninhibited by ar-
bitrary limits on duration, by the illogical exploitation rule, or by anything
else. 22" '
If the courts recognize such uninhibited descent of publicity rights, the
state legislatures should establish a durational limit only when there appears
to be an abuse of this right. Fears of the future,222 however, should-not be
219. See Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 846, 603 P.2d 425, 445-46, 160 Cal.
Rptr. 323, 343-44 (1979) (Bird, C.J., dissenting) (50 year durational limitation in copyright
statute is a reasonable time period to protect post-mortem publicity rights); Dracula's Progeny,
supra note 30, at 1124-28. One author has suggested that one's name and likeness be registered
with the Copyright Office in order to receive appropriate protection. Byers, Copyright to Life:
Toward Copyright Protection for Name and Likeness, 56 CAL. ST. B.J. 52 (1981).
220. See note 109 supra.
221. See, e.g., Note, The Right of Publicity-Protection for Public Figures and Celebrities,
42 BROOKLYN L. REv. 527 (1976).
222. For example, there has long been a fear of a flood of right of publicity suits brought
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used to prevent the recognition and protection of present publicity rights.
Courts today have only two options when faced with the descent question:
either they do not recognize descent at all, or they fully recognize it without
any time limitation. If a durational limit is established by judicial fiat rather
than by legislative action, the courts have usurped a legislative function.
As discussed above, however, the currently imagined fears concerning the
survival of publicity rights are insignificant when compared to the invaluable
loss that will be suffered by a celebrity's heirs and licensees if such rights
are terminated at the celebrity's death. Now is the time for courts to
recognize the fully uninhibited and unlimited descent of publicity rights. If
the need ever arises, subsequent legislative action to correct problems
resulting from unlimited duration is always available. 23
CONCLUSION
The right of privacy has too long been a hindrance to the proper develop-
ment of the right of publicity. The personal aspects of the right of privacy
as well as its nonsurvival rule, are simply not germane to a celebrity's
publicity rights. Even though developed around the personal attributes of
the celebrity, the right of publicity is purely commercial and proprietary in
nature. An invasion of this right causes a direct pecuniary loss, not an in-
jury to feelings. Further, the underlying state interests involved in protect-
ing the right of publicity continue after a celebrity's death. Finally, since
the first amendment privileges of free speech and press will always
dominate over the right of publicity, the descent and subsequent protection
of the right of publicity will never interfere with the public's right to know.
Thus, the right of publicity, as something having pecuniary value even after
a celebrity's death, and which can be separated from the celebrity in both
life and death, should be deemed a true property right for all purposes, in-
cluding descent.
There are no valid policy reasons for preventing the full uninhibited des-
cent of publicity rights. Neither has any reason manifested itself, as yet, to
prevent the perpetual descent of the right of publicity in proper situations.
If any such reason ever surfaces in practice, the legislatures, not the courts,
should be the ones to establish such limits. However, for the present, the
proprietary right of publicity should descend.
by the descendants of long-since deceased ancestors. See Schumann v. Loew's, Inc., 144
N.Y.S.2d 27, 30 (1955). The Second Circuit, however, has recognized the descent of publicity
rights since Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836 (1975), and the number of
frivolous right of publicity suits has not been excessive in that jurisdiction.
223. If legislative action is ever deemed necessary, numerous limitations on descent are
available, such as:
1. For the life of the remaining spouse and/or children;
2. A 25 year limitation on commencement of the suit;
3. Fifty years after the persona's death, as with copyrights; or
4. For the remainder of the term of any of the celebrity's licenses granted during
his life, not to exceed 20 years.
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